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Abstract: This thesis is an attempt to capture ethnic grievances in relations with regime type 
and secession. The unit of analysis is Yugoslavia on a regional level; Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia and Vojvodina. Conditions 
within these units are traced by applying thorough case-studies and fs/QCA. The truth table 
solution provided by the fuzzy-sets analysis support that ethnic grievances can determine civil 
war when appearing together with anocracy as a regime type, and with secession. This would 
support a claim that studies of civil war and ethnicity should aim to capture the political 
context in which ethnic grievances appear rather than to base the research on measures of the 
size of the ethnic groups or degree of diversity. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Can ethnic grievances cause civil war? How can we be able to measure such a relationship? In 
this thesis I set out to capture ethnic grievances‟ effect on civil war onset by analyzing the 
dynamic relationship between ethnic competition, secession and regime type in the former 
Yugoslavia prior to the onset of civil war in 1991. I am concerned with how ethnic grievances 
only seem to affect civil war when appearing in a certain political context; where politics are 
ethnic related and regime types are inconsistent. For ethnic related politics, I mainly focus on 
secessionist policies and responses to them. The purpose is not to isolate one of the 
components, but rather to reveal how they interact. By exploring the interaction we can get 
clues on how war can be avoided even when conditions sufficient to produce it are present. It 
is a premise of this thesis that we can derive valuable information from the study of case-
specific causations. Thus I study conditions within the federative units of Yugoslavia. In this 
selection of cases there is intricate diversity, ethnic tension, asymmetric distribution of power, 
claims for secession and regimes in transition. Still, war only broke out in some of the units. 
What separated these cases from those where war was absent?  Hopefully, comparing the two 
outcomes „war‟ and „absence of war‟ can enrich our understanding of the causes of civil war1.  
1.1 Perceptions of the Sovereign 
In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes (2008[1652]) claimed that the three causes of quarrel among 
men were competition, diffidence and glory. “The first maketh men invade for gain; the 
second, for safety; and the third, for reputation” (Hobbes 2008[1652]: 83)2. To Hobbes, the 
state of war is a state of no assurance of the contrary: A state of no rules and thus no security. 
To end this state, individuals invest their total freedom in the legitimate rule of a sovereign. 
Hobbes could be interpreted as claiming that the sovereign‟s authority and legitimacy derives 
from its attribute as a security-provider. The sovereign is thus connected to the public through 
an agreement of protection. In The Social Contract, Rousseau (2004[1762]) tackles the 
security-guarantee in the state of nature through an analogy of family ties: 
” (…) children remain tied to their father by nature only so long as they need him for 
their preservation. As soon as this need ends, the natural bond is dissolved. Once the 
children are freed from the obedience they owe their father, and the father is freed 
from his responsibilities towards them, both parties equally regain their independence. 
If they continue to remain united, it is no longer nature, but their own choice, which 
                                                 
1 ‟~‟ always indicates negation, „~War‟ is read „the absence of the outcome War” 
2 Chapter XIII; §7. 
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unites them; and the family as such is kept in being only by agreement”  
 (Rousseau 2004[1762]: 2-3).       
What if the two disagrees on the son‟s need for protection? Does the father demand his son‟s 
allegiance for the sake of keeping power, or to protect him for his own good? In international 
relations, this analogy could be translated into claims of secession and domestic grievances. 
When the agreement between family members dissolves, prematurely or not, there are 
different understandings of the secession‟s legitimacy and the status of the successor state 
relative to the security provider. There is a clash of perceptions of the sovereign. Studies 
should aim to reveal the causes of these clashes in order to avoid their outcomes to be fatal.   
1.2 Research Question and Relevance 
The purpose for this thesis is to discuss war as an outcome of ethnic grievances, secession and 
regime type. The units of observation are the federative units of Yugoslavia: Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia and Vojvodina. I 
will explore the relationship between ethnic grievances, secessionist policies and regime type, 
and the impact of these factors on the civil war, 1991-1995
3
. By restricting the analysis to this 
period, I get a comprehensive selection of observable cases; eight federative units sharing the 
fate of Yugoslavia on the basis of shared events prior the onset of war. I pursue a dual 
research question: Can civil war be a function of ethnic grievances, secession and regime 
type? Secondary to this: Would we be better able to capture this triangular relation by 
applying alternative research methods? To pursue these questions, I conduct an analysis 
applying fs/QCA; combining „within-case studies‟ with „cross-case studies‟, with a focus on 
conditions producing either the outcome „war‟ or the „absence of war‟4 (Ragin 1987; 2000; 
2008; Van der Maat 2011). In the following chapter, I argue against an overly aggregated 
approach to the study of civil war. To meet this methodological critique, I will measure the 
applicability of “aggregated models” to the case of the Yugoslavian civil war (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre et al 2001).     
 The thesis is structured as follows: In Chapter 2, I introduce the theoretical framework 
and arguments. My focus is on ethnic grievances, the effect of regime types, and secession. 
When dealing with regime types, the focus is on their attributes‟ effect on political 
competition. When I deal with ethnic grievances, I focus on the fear of ethnic dominance and 
competing groups, rather than on diversity and fragmentation. In Chapter 3, I discuss the 
                                                 
3 Thus, the thesis‟ appraisal restricts the discussion to deal with the first wave of secession and war in Yugoslavia, and leave out monumental 
events such as genocide in Kosovo, Albanian rebellion in Macedonia and the late sovereignty of Montenegro and Kosovo. 
4 The absence of war is referred to as‟ ~war‟ 
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methodology of comparative analyses, and give an introduction to fs/QCA and the applied 
research design. In Chapter 4, I present data conducted from the first stage of the analysis; the 
multiple case studies, or the „within-case analysis‟. In Chapter 5, I first conduct an analysis to 
reduce the raw data and locate the most important conditions. These are pursued in the more 
specified fuzzy-set analysis. Then I produce a truth table solution to „war‟ and the „~war‟ in 
Yugoslavia, 1991. Also, I test the applicability of the models of Collier and Hoeffler (2004), 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Hegre et al (2001). In Chapter 6, I conclude from the analysis 
and evaluate the support for my theoretical propositions.      
 My conclusion is that the effect of ethnic grievances relies on the regime type and 
political propositions the grievances appear with. I do not argue that ethnic grievances are a 
constant factor in diverse societies, but that they appear and disappear with variations in the 
political context. I thus argue that research should aim to capture the political context in 
diverse societies in order to properly measure the effect of ethnic grievances. Figure 1.1 
attempts to illustrate this. I recognize the critical aspect of generalizing from a small selection 
and this aspect of fs/QCA is not emphasized. I would rather emphasize how alternative 
methodological approaches might be beneficial in capturing the effect of an abstract condition 
as “ethnic grievances”, and that my analyses support this proposition.   
 
Figure 1.1 Studies should aim to capture the relations between conditions 
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2.0 Theory: Ethnic Grievances, Regime Types and Secession 
In this chapter I present the theoretical framework. It is concerned with ethnic grievances, 
secession policies and regime types, and how this triangle affect civil war onset. I start by 
defining civil war and discuss certain approaches to its study. Then I deal with ethnic 
grievances and secession before I discuss these two components in terms of regime type.  The 
causations I suggest are illustrated by Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 Proposed causation between secession, ethnic grievances and regime type 
What separates „war‟ from the absence of war, or „~war‟5, is what kind of regime type the 
combination of secession policies and ethnic grievances are interacting with. If these 
conditions appear with anocracy, I expect ethnic grievances, in terms of fear of future ethnic 
dominance, to culminate into war. If they appear with democracy, I expect the qualities of this 
regime type to reduce the tensions between the competing groups. Ethnic grievances would 
thus not produce war even when interacting with secession, because the ethnic groups will 
compete for power by conventional political means rather than through conflict.    
 
 
                                                 
5 „~‟ in front of a condition or outcome indicates negation or absence of the condition. 
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 2.1 Civil War: Definition and General Approaches 
I treat „civil war‟ as the dependent variable. Civil war is a subset of an „armed conflict‟, 
defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project as “a contested incompatibility that concerns 
government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at 
least 25 battle-related deaths. Of these two parties, at least one is the government of a state” 
(Gleditsch et al 2002:618-619). „War‟ is separated from „Minor Armed Conflict6‟ and 
„Intermediate Armed Conflict7‟ by the threshold of at least 1‟000 battle-related deaths per 
year (Gleditsch et al 2002:619). „Civil war‟ is thus an internal armed conflict, defined as a 
conflict “between the government of a state and internal opposition groups without 
intervention from other states” (Gleditsch et al 2002:619). The frequency of civil wars peaked 
in the aftermath of the Cold War. Again, it is increasing after reaching a low point and today, 
most wars being fought are civil wars (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010).   
 Is there an aggregated solution to what causes civil war? Collier et al (2003) 
acknowledge the distinctiveness of each war. Any “all-embracing general theory of civil war 
would therefore be patently ridiculous, and sensibly enough most analyses are country-
specific, historical accounts” (Collier et al 2003:54). However, they argue, statistical 
aggregated approaches protects against over-generalizing from particular conflicts. Civil war 
studies should focus on asking why rebellious groups are formed, what their motives are and 
what their opportunities are (Collier et al 2003:54). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) stand for one 
of the most prominent studies of civil war onset. This model emphasizes primary commodity 
exports, and especially oil exports, and how a state that is dependent of such is prone to civil 
war. This suggests „greed‟, or as later rephrased to „opportunity‟, to be the strongest 
determinant of civil war: What determines civil war is the opportunity to finance rebellion. 
However, their results concerning oil exports are rarely reproduced. Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
are more concerned with state capacity. GDP/Capita is a proxy for state strength, rough 
terrain is a proxy for the potential for insurgencies and political instability is a proxy for state 
performance. Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) agree that opportunity 
matter, but they differ in their acknowledgment of motive; is it the degree of state presence or 
opportunity for finance that is the most determinant factors?  Civil wars are not easily 
distinguished into “justice-seeking” and “loot-seeking” wars. Kalvyas (2001) asks if there is a 
valid distinction between “new” and “old” civil wars, a question directed towards the notion 
                                                 
6 Minor Armed Conflict: At least 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the 
cause of the conflict (Gleditsch et al 2002:619). 
7 Intermediate Armed Conflict: At least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 
1,000 in any given year (Gleditsch 2002:619).  
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that civil wars have become more of a criminal matter than a matter of ideology and 
grievances. He suggests that the notion of new wars as pursuits for loot could actually be a 
product of biased journalism.        
 Is our understanding of civil war affected by the methodological approaches to the 
subject? Sambanis (2004) provides an analytical review of existing coding rules and points to 
the difficulty of accurately defining and measuring civil war. He points to the risk of making 
inferences from unstable empirical results due to the lack of consensus on how to measure 
civil war. Most projects do not conduct original historical research, but depend heavily on 
existing data. This might lead to replication of errors (Sambanis 2004). Hegre and Sambanis 
(2006) conduct a robustness check of empirical results. They do this by employing one 
standard definition for civil wars across multiple isolated causes and time periods. The most 
robust causes are large population, low income levels, low rates of economic growth, recent 
political instability and inconsistent democratic institutions, small military establishments and 
rough terrain, and war-prone and undemocratic neighbors. Ethnic differences, however, are 
only robust in relation to lower level of armed conflict and not to the definition of „war‟ that 
requires 1‟000 annual deaths.          
 However, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) do not leave much 
to explain the causes of grievances. When the economical factors are discussed, it is mostly in 
terms of opportunity, looting and state capacity, not in terms of poverty and grievances. And, 
there is definitely no room for ethnic grievances. They perform tests for the effect of ethnic 
fragmentation, polarization, dominance and size of minority, but these variables are mostly 
statistically rejected or with minimum of effect. This is peculiar to many; are there not 
examples of ethnic groups fighting each other off for power? This is partly why I focus on 
Yugoslavia; due to the complexity of the ethnic composition and grievances together with 
different secession policies and regime types. Is the case of Yugoslavia best explained by 
components in Collier and Hoeffler‟s model or by Fearon and Laitin‟s model? Or are perhaps 
the perceptions of causes of civil war influenced by these studies‟ methodological approach? 
Could alternative approaches to conflict studies provide different results concerning ethnic 
grievances? If so, what is left to say about the significance of ethnic grievances, and how are 
they related to conflict? 
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2.2 Grievances and Ethnic Civil Wars 
How come Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find so little room for 
ethnic grievances in their explanations of civil war? One reason for why earlier attempts fail 
to link ethnic grievances to civil war onset is the way ethnic grievances are measured. I will 
base my critique of these models on alternative concepts for capturing ethnic grievances, as 
well as revisiting some of the literature these models claim they derive their theory from. I 
argue that approaching civil war as an aggregated dependent variable could make us ignore 
important causes or make them seem trivial. I also argue that the effect of grievances is best 
captured by studying the distinct political context in which it appears.   
 Fearon and Laitin (2003) try to capture ethnic grievances in several ways; by 
accounting for states with an ethnic minority exceeding 5% of the total population and by 
measuring the degree of ethnic diversity by applying ELF
8
. These measures of ethnic 
grievances are substantially and statistically insignificant
9
. However, one can ask if the 
ambition to capture grievances is met by using these measures, and if the study not suffers 
from misuse of variation. Lieberson (1985) warns about the misuse of variance: It is critical if 
the concern is with pursuing variables with the most proper variation. This might lead 
researchers to study some problems while ignoring others (Ibid: 91). Hypotheses of ethnic 
grievances based on a linear relationship between the degree of diversity and the risk of war 
do not capture the actual relation where these grievances appear. Testing these hypotheses 
with the ELF-measure is also critical, because ELF is really a tool for measuring 
fragmentation on an individual level, while conflict is a group-level phenomenon (Cederman 
and Girardin 2007; Cederman, Buhaug and Rød 2009; Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010; 
Horowitz 1985). Since conflict is a group-level phenomenon, measures of ethnic grievances 
should account for spatial distribution and not simply the degree of diversity
10
. Arguably, 
studies applying ELF thus suffer a threat to validity from a misplaced level of analysis 
(Lieberson 1985).          
 Collier and Hoeffler (2004) employ the variable „ethnic dominance‟ to capture ethnic 
grievances; the prospect for ethnic minorities to be politically dominated by a majority group 
is proxied by whether the largest ethnic group constitutes 45%-90% of the population or not. 
This proxy is the only measure for ethnic grievance that receives some empirical support. 
                                                 
8 Ethnic Linguistic Fractionalization, the chance of two randomly drawn individuals belong to different ethnic groups:  
 
           
     
 
9 Additionally, they account for the share of the population belonging to the largest ethnic group, the number of languages spoken, and the 
degree of religious fractionalization by a measure similar to ELF. 
10 The variable „size of the minority‟ does to a certain degree control for cohesion, but this proxy mixes cases where minorities are 
concentrated with cases where the minorities are spread. 
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They also measure for polarization
11
, but these variables are insignificant. Ethnic diversity, 
again measured with ELF, has in fact a negative effect on civil war onset; diversity makes a 
society safer if it does not turn into dominance. However, it would be critical to rely on the 
ethnic dominance-proxy for grievance because the operationalization of this proxy assumes 
that ethnically dominant policies are a constant force, catalyzed when the largest ethnic group 
exceeds 45%. Cederman, Buhaug and Rød (2009) argue that this simple measure hardly can 
reflect the complexity of ethnonationalist civil wars (Ibid: 499). Horowitz (1985) argues that 
such political behavior is restricted to ethnical divided states, and is rooted in the political 
context rather than to the mere size of the groups. Also, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) construct 
the variable from a calculation based on data from USSR (1964). This is arguably a too static 
measure to capture the de facto circumstances
12
.      
 Another aspect shared by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) is 
the approach to the dependent variable; they both analyze all civil war onsets. Could this 
influence the results? Cederman, Buhaug and Rød (2009) argue that the controversy 
surrounding the importance of ethnic grievances are largely due to aggregated and 
problematic research designs. Sambanis (2001) argues in favor of disaggregating “civil war” 
into distinct kinds of wars. Identity wars are due to political grievance rather than to economic 
opportunity. Ethnic diversity and grievances are also differently associated with such wars 
than with non-identity wars. Do we lose important nuances in aggregating the dependent 
variable? Do we risk important conditions becoming trivial? “Conventional wisdom suggests 
that each war is as different as the society that produced it” (Sambanis 2001:259). Multiple 
causes to the same output are called “causal complexity” (Ragin 2000). Causal complexity 
would require us to disaggregate civil war into distinct kinds of war, because conditions 
consistent in producing one kind of war might only be a trivial cause of another kind of war. 
Thus, conditions producing “ethnic conflicts” could be irrelevant for explaining “socialist 
revolutions”, but as they are still consistent in producing the outcome of interest, they should 
be investigated properly. I apply the principle of disaggregating the dependent variable by 
exclusively approaching the Yugoslavian civil war; the instances of civil war should be 
related through the selection of cases. Thus, I reduce the risk of comparing wars of different 
kinds with each other as I assume the cases to produce the same kind of war.  
                                                 
11 Esteban-Ray (1994):  P * (   =     
         
 
           
11 Reynal-Querol (2000): IRC1 =                            
12 The dynamics of ethnic composition will be explored further in the analysis to supplement this critique.      
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 Horowitz (1985) is applied by Fearon and Laitin (2003)
13
 to provide a theoretical link 
between ethnic diversity and conflict. However, while Fearon and Laitin reduce Horowitz‟ 
propositions into the hypothesis “more diversity→ more risk of conflict”, possibly to meet the 
assumption of linearity, Horowitz is much more explicit in his deliberations on ethnic 
conflict
14
. The impact of ethnicity on civil war relies on the political context. He claims that 
“Shifting contexts make ethnicity now more, now less prominent” (Horowitz 1985:4). Ethnic 
grievances are relevant when the context is „ethnically charged‟. Such a tension is an attribute 
in deeply ethnic divided societies, societies where strong ethnic allegiances permeate 
organizations and bureaucracies, and where otherwise routine administration “assumes a 
central place on the political agenda” (Horowitz 1985:8). When the political context is 
charged by ethnicity, political parties are captured by zero-sum ethnic politics (Zartmann 
2005). A consequence of this is the formation of ethnic parties. These parties would polarize 
the political spectrum by deriving influence from ethnic zero-sum politics, while non-ethnic 
parties could have found compromises in the centre. The strength of the polarization and 
appeal of the ethnic parties are reliant on the degree of group division and cohesion (Horowitz 
1985:293; Zartmann 2005).  
 
Figure 2.2 Ethnic rhetoric polarizes the political spectrum 
To adapt Horowitz‟ principles to any diverse society would be a misuse of his propositions 
because they describe political spectrums „charged‟ with ethnic policies. Horowitz would thus 
support a disaggregated operationalization of civil war because his principles do no attempt to 
explain conflict in societies without this tension. His propositions would also support 
pursuing ethnic grievances in relation with certain policies and regime types. ELF would not 
be able to capture Horowitz‟ perceptions of ethnic grievances because they ignore the role of 
the state. And, as Horowitz states: “Control of the state, control of a state, and exemption 
                                                 
13 Also by Sambanis (2001) and Østby (2008) 
14 Arguably, Horowitz‟ propositions belong to instrumentalism, while Fearon and Laitin mistake them for pirmordialism 
11 
 
from control by others are among the main goals of ethnic conflict” (Horowitz 1985:515). 
 Cederman and Girardin (2007) follow up on this argument. They claim that any study 
that apply ELF to capture ethnic grievances fail to produce a meaningful operationalization of 
ethnic politics. The state is paramount in all civil wars by definition (Cederman and Girardin 
2007:174
16
). Thus, to capture ethnic grievances related with conflict, one must capture group-
level dynamics and the role of the state. They suggest “ethnic exclusion”, measured by N*17. 
As opposed to ELF and diversity concepts, „exclusion‟ aims to capture ethnic grievance by 
the size of the groups excluded from power
18. By this principle, one can measure a country‟s 
risk of conflict from the size of the ethnic groups relative to each other. If the group in power 
decreases relative to the competing groups, the country becomes more prone to conflict 
(Cederman and Girardin 2007).         
 But what if the excluded groups would rebel against the group in power in order to 
secede? Ethnic grievances can be linked to the doctrine of national self-determination, and to 
the spreading norms of equality that made ethnic subordination illegitimate (Horowitz 1985). 
The political context would thus be charged by ethnic grievances and secession policies. 
Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010) connect this relation to the fear of ethnic dominance in 
terms of „fear of future domination‟ that triggers secession. Thus, the fear of dominance, 
rather than actual presence of dominance, is highly relevant but difficult to measure. Ethnic 
grievances might derive from ethnic competition for- and exclusion from- power, then lead to 
claims of secession and produce war. It makes sense; large excluded groups claim autonomy 
if their size exceeds their influence – according to the principle of national self-determination. 
This fits the principle of polarization as well; when a minority group increases in size relative 
to the majority in power, their size could exceed their influence (Ellingsen 2000; Reynal-
Querol 2002). In this way, polarization of the groups might lead to increased ethnically driven 
politics and competition. If one group is excluded from power and clustered in contiguous 
areas, this could lead to claims of increased autonomy or secession.    
 What if these regions are not homogenously populated by the minority, but include 
factions of the domestic majority as well? Such pockets of settlements would make the 
majority a minority and possibly ignite the fear of future dominance within the secessionist 
state. What can discharge this tension? How can the fear of dominance be removed? Collier 
(2001) argues that secession should be discouraged since much conflict derives from 
                                                 
15 Italics in original 
16 They refer here to Sambanis (2004) 
17N*: Pr(CivilConflict) = 1 –                 
18 Cederman and Girardin (2007) also employs the terms “in centre” in “in periphery”. 
12 
 
secession. I argue that the emphasis should be on making secession peaceful, rather than to 
discourage it. If conflicted responses to secession derive from ethnic grievances, one solution 
could be to remove the fear of future dominance. I argue that regime type plays a crucial part 
in this removal.  
2.3 Regime Types Related to Grievances and Conflict 
I will now discuss the significance of regime types, the attributes of „anocracies‟ and 
„democracies‟ and how they can be related to civil war. „Anocracy‟ refers to regimes that are 
neither an „autocracy‟ nor a „democracy‟19. The reasons for excluding „autocracy‟ are two-
fold: First, as the analysis will rely upon the PolityIV dataset, none of the observed units are 
autocracies
20
; they are either democracies or anocracies (Gurr, Jaggers and More 1989; 
Jaggers and Gurr 1995). Second, the important aspect to me is whether democracy is absent or 
present. In this context, both „anocracy‟ and „autocracy‟ are subsets of „absent democracy‟.
 The argument of democracy‟s peaceful attributes has usually relied upon analyses of 
states‟ participation in interstate wars. However, the evidences for a monadic democratic 
peace are mixed (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997)
 21
. Gates et al (1996) argues that tests of the 
democratic peace must control for endogeneity and causation; does peace follow democracy 
or the other way around? Bremer (1992) approaches the attributes of democracies and 
suggests that the confusion concerning the monadic attributes of democracy have been due to 
a misplaced level of analysis: Most studies were done at a monadic level rather than a dyadic 
level. He finds support for the democratic dyadic peace: Risk of war between pairs of 
undemocratic states is by far larger than between pairs of democratic states
22
. The presence of 
only one democracy in a dyad also reduces the risk of war and this suggests a monadic 
democratic peace. Buhaug (2005) supports the dyadic democratic peace, but suggests that 
Bremer‟s finding of a monadic democratic peace might be due to his operationalization of 
„democracy‟. Gartzke (2007) argues that it is not the regime type that makes democracies 
more peaceful, but rather how democracies interact with liberalism and capitalism.  
 However, the democratic peace at this state mostly refers to the democratic states‟ 
reliability to participate in interstate war. As the frequency of interstate wars decrease while 
civil wars increase, the effect of democracy on intrastate wars becomes more interesting. This 
will require a methodological shift from the measure of democratic participation in wars, to 
                                                 
19 Often called „intermediate regime‟ or „semi-democracy‟. 
20I count states with the value ≥ 6 on the PolityII variable as democracies: Autocracy: -10 to -6, Anocracy: -5 to +5, Democracy: +6 to +10  
21 ”Monadic Democratic Peace” refers to the states being peaceful by itself, while a ”Dyadic Democratic Peace” refers to dyads of 
democracies being peaceful toward each other. 
22 This is supported by advocates of the “Kantian-peace” (Oneal and Russett 1999; Oneal and Russett 2001; Oneal, Russett and Berbaum 
2003). 
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the frequency of wars within democracies. And, moreover, research should aim to trace the 
various attributes of regime types to the changing effect on conflict. This is the aim of Hegre 
et al (2001). This study approaches the effect of democracy on civil peace, both by focusing 
on regime type and level of democracy, but also on the amount of change in a regime. They 
find support for anocracies to be more prone to civil war than both democracies and 
autocracies. Also, a country that has undergone a recent political transition is more prone to 
civil war than if the system had been stable. Autocracies are indirectly more prone to future 
war than democracies due to the expected polity duration (Hegre et al 2001). This aspect of 
polity duration is explored further by Gates et al (2006).     
 Which attributes of democracy and anocracy could be related to risk of civil war? 
Gates et al (2006) separates consistent- from inconsistent institutions. They find that 
institutionally consistent regimes, whether autocracies or democracies, are more stable than 
inconsistent regimes. This is due to the institutional self-maintenance within these regime 
types. These institutions are proxied by “Executive Recruitment”, “Executive Constraints” 
and “Participation”. If there is no open recruitment to the executive, no constraints on the 
executive or public participation, it is an ideal autocracy. The executive is hardly challenged, 
and the reinforcing institutions “bolster one another” (Gates et al 2006:894). If all these 
conditions are present, it is an ideal democracy. The constraints on the executive restricts it 
from full control, it is an open recruitment to his/her position and the public is allowed to 
participate; again, these institutions are mutually reinforcing. Only some of these conditions 
are present in anocracies (Gates et al 2006).  I am most concerned with the lack of constraints 
on the executive as it could imply a reduced security guarantee and thus ignite fear of 
dominance in a diverse society. If the constraints on the executive are absent, the payoffs for 
political victories could exceed long term institutional interests. It could be worth running 
severe risks to achieve the executive position - risks that would otherwise be irrational to run 
if the executive brought any less than total power.       
 In a certain political context, this could make ethnic groups risking survival to achieve 
the dominant position because the opposite outcome could lead to non-survival. If the payoffs 
in the competition for power are either survival or non-survival, the risks running from the 
process of getting to power would always be outweighed by the payoff. This is how fear of 
ethnic dominance could lead to war when democracy is absent; by charging the political 
spectrum and determining risks and payoffs in the political game. To this proposition, 
democracy would reduce this tension by putting constraints on the executive, and thus reduce 
the incentive from competing for the executive at mutually exclusive terms. It should also be 
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expected that proper democratic institutions would be more responsive to ethnic grievances, 
unrelated to which ethnic group constituting the executive, and thus reduce ethnic grievances 
to begin with. 
 
Figure 2.3 Anocracy motivates ethnic groups to compete for the executive by zero-sum means 
I have related regime type and ethnic grievances to civil war through the fear of dominance, 
and by pointing to how lack of constraints on the executive can make the incentives to reach 
for this position exceed the risks running from competing for it. From this, I propose that 
consistent democratic institutions could be the crossing point between peaceful- and 
conflicted secessions, and thus valuable in achieving transitional peace.  
2.4 Summary, Argument and Hypotheses 
In this chapter, I have discussed civil war and how it can be a function of ethnic grievances, 
secessionist policies and regime types. I have emphasized how conflict can derive from 
exclusion which again could lead to secession. This delicate situation would make a society 
war prone, especially if the secessionist state is populated by settlements in fear of future 
dominance. I suggest that democracy could function as a mediator to ethnic tensions, while 
the absence of democracy could increase tensions and intensify both fear of dominance and 
the incentives for competing for the executive on mutually exclusive terms. Cederman, 
Wimmer and Min (2010) admit that the relation „fear of future domination, secession and civil 
war‟ hardly can be captured by conventional methods (Ibid: 110). I argue for the application 
of set-relations theory and the methods of fs/QCA to capture this relation (Ragin 1987; 2000; 
2008). If the presence of the combination of secessionist policies, ethnic grievances and 
anocracy consistently leads to war, we can say that they are necessary conditions for war as an 
15 
 
outcome. If this triangular relation is sufficient for producing war, war should consistently 
appear in cases where the relation appears. This will be the outset for the analysis: to uncover 
which combinations of conditions that appear in cases that produce war, and compare them to 
the conditions in cases that do not produce war. The analysis must thus account for variables 
concerning ethnic composition, regime types, secessionist policies and relationship towards 
the power centre. To include models with a different perspective, I include components from 
the models of Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Hegre et al (2001).  
For the analysis to support that war can be a function of the triangular relation, I propose four 
hypotheses for testing: Hypothesis 1: 
Competing ethnic groups are necessary for 
secession to produce the outcome „war‟. 
Secession is “charged” by the presence of 
competing ethnic groups. If war is present 
where competing groups are absent, the 
hypothesis is rejected.   
 Hypothesis 2: Democracy is consistent in 
producing „~war‟23: Whenever democracy is 
present, war is absent, no matter if necessary causes are present. Thus, if democracy appears 
where war is produced, this hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Figure 2.5 Democracy prevents necessary causes from producing war 
Hypothesis 3: War is produced when secession appears with competing groups and absence 
of democracy: This hypothesis aims at the political context: Ethnic grievances in terms of 
ethnic competition can cause war in certain political contexts. Thus, if war is not present when 
competing groups are present, secession is present and democracy is absent, this hypothesis is 
rejected.  
                                                 
23 „~‟ in front of a condition or an outcome refers to the negated –or absence of the condition/outcome. 
Figure 2.4 Competing groups charge secession with war         
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Figure 2.6 Policies, Ethnic Grievances and Regime Type → War 
Hypothesis 4: When democracy is present at secession, internal secession is absent. One of the 
qualities of democracy is that it discharges the fear of dominance and thus removes the 
foundation for internal secession as a response to the initial secession. In Yugoslavia, the most 
significant action was related to secessionist claims from within the successor states. I 
propose that democracy 
would remove much of the 
incentive to compete for 
power and autonomy on 
mutually exclusive terms, 
because it would reduce the 
fear of future dominance. If 
internal secession is present 
where democracy is absent, 
this hypothesis is rejected. The hypotheses will be tested in an analysis applying fs/QCA. I 
devote the next chapter to introduce fs/QCA and discuss the application of the method, critical 
aspects of aggregated approaches and certain threats to validity in comparative studies. From 
there, I present the within-case- and cross-case analyses.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Secession – Democracy - ~Internal secession 
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3.0 Methodology and Research Design 
This chapter provides an introduction to the application of fuzzy sets and QCA, explains key 
terms and operations and review some earlier applications of the method
24
. Further, I discuss 
the potential of the application to conflict studies before I present the research design for this 
study and discuss various threats to validity.  
3.1 A Brief Introduction to Key Terms and Operations 
The strategy for this study is a comparative one. The comparison is made between the 
federative units of Yugoslavia and the same process of data collection and data analysis is 
done throughout all the units of analysis
25
. The method applied in this comparative study is 
fs/QCA. This approach allows for combining attributes from small-N studies and large-N 
studies by relying on qualitative states of full memberships or full nonmemberships and the 
quantitative variation in between these states (Ragin 2000:8). Analyses made by fs/QCA 
demand thorough case-specific knowledge in order to calibrate data into variables –or 
conditions- and might employ probabilistic methods in order to transform linguistic variables 
into compatible values. A key criterion for fs/QCA analyses is the presence and/or absence of 
conditions in the observed units, and the comparison between units that share and differ in 
producing specific outcomes (Ragin 1987; 2000; 2008)
26
.      
 The fs/QCA analysis sets out to reveal which conditions are necessary and/or 
sufficient for a given outcome
27
. Conditions can be single variables or a combination of 
variables; causal combinations. A sufficient condition is a condition (X) that occurs in an 
outcome (Y), and whenever X occurs, Y is produced. Thus, if X is a sufficient condition to 
produce Y, then X≤Y. A necessary condition is a condition (X) occurring whenever the 
outcome (Y) is produced. Thus, if necessary, X≥Y, because a necessary condition must be 
present to produce Y. Conditional statements can be reversed or converted; if X is sufficient 
for Y, Y is necessary for X (Caramani 2009:44). At the end of an fs/QCA-study, we want to 
be able to reduce all necessary and sufficient conditions into solutions. In this way, complex 
relations usually demanding several pages of narration can be summarized in single sentences. 
These expressions are made from entering all data into truth tables. The truth table then 
                                                 
24 From now referred to as fs/QCA 
25 This is according to the principles of comparison, proposed by J. Galtung (1979:46). 
26 The principle of presence/absence of attributes in comparative social sciences can be traced back even to Locke‟s tradition, constituted in 
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [1690], later to Hegel‟s Wissenschaft der Logik [1816], and off course, the three methods of 
agreement, difference and the joint method manifested in John Stuart Mill‟s A System of Logic [1843]. In spite of the major impact up until 
today, Mill rejected the application of his methods to social sciences because he expected that it would be impossible to isolate variables, and 
thus it would be impossible to eliminate the threat to validity from spuriousness. Weber26 [1922] followed Mill‟s principles in social 
sciences. He argued that pure experiments were restricted to some psychological studies, statistics were restricted to mass phenomena, while 
comparison should be the reigning approach to empirical social studies (in Caramani 2009:6-8; Ragin 2000). 
27 In fs/QCA, variables are referred to as conditions. 
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constructs the truth table algorithm; rows with all logically possible combinations of the 
conditions. All these combinations should be constituted by cases. Combinations without 
empirical instances constitute the limited diversity. The size of limited diversity should be 
taken into account when concluding from the study because we never know what the outcome 
would be where these combinations of conditions would appear
28
. The researcher can 
distinguish the cases where outcome is present from where they are absent and then use truth 
table algorithm to reduce all conditions to produce the truth table solution. By this, those 
conditions that have little or no consistency and those that have too little coverage to 
contribute anything to the solution, are reduced away (Ragin 1987; 2000; 2008).  
 The attributes of sets are based on the Boolean algebra; initially variables are either 
present or absent in a case, leading to either (1) or (0) in the truth table. These are qualitative 
anchors describing either full membership or full nonmembership in the condition. When we 
operate with only 1 or 0, we deal with crisp sets. In fuzzy-sets, 0 still marks full 
nonmembership, but fuzzy-sets allows for different degrees of membership in the condition. 
Qualitative anchors of 1 and 0 remains, but in addition we get 0.5; “neither in nor out”. On 
top of these qualitative anchors, we have fuzzy membership; every value between 0 and 1. 
Thus, most analyses focus on all partial members of a set, and only exclude those who are 
fully nonmembers
29
. How many levels of membership the fuzzy-sets are divided into is up to 
the researcher. However, this calibration must be thoroughly anchored in empirics and should 
also be available to any colleague who might want to replicate the study (Caramani 2009; 
Ragin 1987; 2000; 2008)
30
.        
 Consistency- and coverage tests are conducted to reveal which conditions to be 
excluded and included in an analysis. Consistency
31
 reflects how often condition X occurs in 
the group of cases that produce the outcome. Perfect consistent conditions are rare in social 
science. However, in this study I move as deep as comparing only two cases, and thus I 
require perfect consistency for a condition (Ragin 2008:45). For instance, when I compare 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, secession with war, to Slovenia and Macedonia, secession 
without war, the condition needs to appear in both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to be 
considered consistent in producing the outcome „war‟. Likewise, a condition needs to appear 
in both Slovenia and Macedonia in order to be considered consistent in producing the 
                                                 
28 However, as Ragin (2000) argues, similar to Cioffi-Revilla (1981), limited diversity is the rule in social phenomena, not the exception. 
Thus, limited diversity should be expected in all studies and may be eliminated from the study by reducing the property space (Ragin 
2000:78f). 
29 Classifications of various degree of membership is available in Appendix 1 
30 That is why I make the entire truth table and the logic behind every operationalization available in the appendices. 
31 Consistency (Xi ≤ Yi) = ∑[min(Xi,Yi)]/∑(Xi) 
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outcome „~war‟32. Coverage-tests33 are applied to separate possible consistent, but irrelevant, 
conditions from relevant conditions. A condition that occurs consistently within Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Croatia, but also in the other six units, would only have a 2/8 = ¼ coverage, 
which is a minimum of coverage in an analysis with eight units. The condition covers too 
little of the outcome (Ragin 2008:55). Another way to put it is that I wish to contrast away 
conditions that do not vary across the groups of cases producing alternate outcomes.    
3.2 A Review of the Employment of Fs/QCA 
There have been made a distinction between a „comparative perspective and strategy‟, usually 
connected with the application of statistics, and a „comparative method‟ (Caramani 2009:14). 
In a study of revolutions, Skocpol (1979) argued that there must be applied a comparative 
logic separated from statistical methods when a study demands a focus on the cases and not 
the variables. Her historical comparative method is meant to develop valid explanations of 
phenomena with relative few occurrences (Skocpol 1979:33-37). Ragin (1987; 2000) adds to 
this distinction by contrasting case-oriented research to variable-oriented research applying 
statistics. Zadeh (1965) first introduced fuzzy-set theory to the studies of electrical 
engineering and refined set-theory by recreating sets as a class of objects with a continuum of 
grades of membership. The first attempt to apply the methods to International Relations was 
made by Cioffi-Revilla (1981). He argued that the necessity for fuzzy-sets ran from 
imprecision: Imprecision is not a consequence of poor measurement or data collection and 
conventional methods are thus not suited to capture this natural fuzziness. Leung (1983) 
reviews prior applications of fuzzy-sets in attempts to determine budget necessity and 
economical spatial behavior
34
. He concludes that the fuzzy-sets approach is developed out of 
necessity and demonstrates how a large number of problems simply cannot be analyzed with 
“exactitude when our systems are highly complex, and our information and decision-making 
processes are ambiguous” (Leung 1983:73). In terms of theory building, he argues that the 
incorporation of fuzzy-sets theory will enrich existing aggregated and formalized methods. 
 Earlier applications of fuzzy-sets all relied heavily on formalized presentations of the 
research. This could arguably lead to a false perception of fuzzy-sets and Boolean approaches 
as mathematically demanding, thus scaring small-N related scientists away. Ragin (1987, 
                                                 
32 ‟~‟ in front of a variable refers to the negated variable, or absent variable. 
33 Coverage (Xi ≤ Yi) = ∑[min(Xi,Yi)]/∑(Yi) 
34 The application of fuzzy sets in business related studies have been explored on various levels.  Sanjian (1988) develops a model from 
fuzzy-sets for exports decision making. He aims at describing how the model can provide an exporter with the optimal strategy for an 
importer. He sums up by testing the transfer strategies of the United States for a sample of importers. This is a method that could be valuable 
to i.e. the allocation of aid according to policy conditions. Other examples of the diverse application of fuzzy-sets includes the study of 
insurance and pricing decision (Sánchez and Gomès 2003), the proper booking of vehicles (John and Bennett 1997) and manpower planning 
(Guerry 1999). 
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2000) introduces the more graphical approach with fs/QCA. First, The Comparative Method 
(1987) introduces QCA based on Boolean algebra and crisp-sets. A more sophisticated 
approach was introduced in the (2000) Fuzzy-sets social science. The method is constantly 
developing, and Ragin includes probabilistic methods to construct the fuzzy-sets in 
Redesigning Social Inquiry Fuzzy sets and beyond (2008). While the studies pre Ragin 
arguably communicated poorly to any social researcher not closely related to math, more 
recent studies rely more on Ragin‟s perception of fuzzy-sets, also benefiting from the free and 
easily operated fs/QCA software (Ragin, Drass and Davey 2006; Ragin 1987; 2000; 2008). 
Chan (2003) applies Boolean algebra to determine which conditions are present when wars 
are terminated. Stokke (2007) analyzes shaming as a strategy for improving the effectiveness 
of international regimes. Stokke and Chan‟s applications are pretty hands-on approaches to 
QCA, leaving the more extensive use of fuzzy-sets suggested for further research. Van der 
Maat (2011) employs fs/QCA more ambitiously in a study of interventional wars; extensive 
narrative case studies culminate in a fuzzy-set analysis and algorithm solutions
35
.  
3.3 Fs/QCA in Peace and Conflict Studies? 
Why is there a need for the fs/QCA in peace and conflict studies? As I have discussed, the 
effect of ethnic grievances is often rejected (Collier 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon 
and Laitin 2003; Fearon, Kasara and Laitin 2007). These are often highly aggregated studies, 
employing a lot of proxies or simple thresholds to replace actual data on real grievance-
related relations
36
. Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010) even suggest that grievance-theories 
never have been tested, only proxied. Let‟s take Collier and Hoeffler‟s (2004) employment of 
proxies: Parts of the opportunity-model and almost the entire grievance-model are based on 
proxies (Collier and Hoeffler 2004:570ff). The „Hostile Government‟ grasp for a very 
plausible theoretical aspect: Governments hostile to the current regime and thus sympathetic 
to rebellion, increase the risk of war onset in the observed state. But the complex relationship 
between a rebellious group and sympathetic governments are supposed to be accounted for by 
a single proxy; whether the conflict arose before or after the end of the Cold War
37
 (Collier 
and Hoeffler 2004:568f). Obviously, such a variable receives little empirical support and is 
thus dropped from the model. However, if a variable could grasp the relation between 
neighboring countries and hostile policies, the theoretical proposition might receive more 
empirical support. Fs/QCA aims to account for such relations by measuring cases‟ degree of 
                                                 
35 I draw from Van der Maat (2011) in the execution and structure of the analysis. 
36 Proxies are single variables meant to theoretically “mirror” complicated relations instead of actually accounting for those relations they 
aim to measure the effect of. 
37 For a more recent example of research based on oversimplified proxies, see Percy and Harding (2010). 
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membership in causal combinations. For instance, the theory could claim that „autocracies see 
a risk of civil war if neighboring states hosts a large proportion of the autocracy‟s minorities 
as immigrants‟. „Hostile government‟ holds a quite complex relation between regime type, 
neighboring countries, minority policies and diaspora in this proposition. To find a proper 
proxy for this relation could be difficult, but a causal combination could answer for the cases‟ 
membership in the fuzzy-set “Autocracy AND large share of minority population in 
neighboring countries”. If the case is a member of this set and produces the outcome „war‟, 
this could bring further support to the proposition. Also, there has been a common perception 
among researchers that conditions concerning ethnic composition are slowly evolving- and 
thus could do with a static measure
38
. This brings us back to the application of the ELF 
index
39
. In the next chapter, I show that ethnic composition is rather fluid and dynamic and 
that the ELF measurement is not representative for the actual situation (Cederman and 
Girardin 2007; Posner 2004).        
 I have previously argued that it can be beneficial to disaggregate a dependent variable 
like „civil war‟, and that such approach is likely to produce results more responsive to the 
causal complexity and important relationships otherwise difficult to capture. Thus, as a 
reaction to the heavy employment of proxies, fs/QCA and set-relations theory could be 
applied. It would demand a larger focus on thorough case-specific research and thus force a 
reduction of N to a comprehensible size, but the results would have less threat to validity from 
the level of analysis
40
. However, fs/QCA does not only rely on small-N inductions, which 
would have been in conflict with Waltz‟ (2010[1979]) propositions. He argues that 
constructing theories based on induction alone would limit the researcher from getting an 
understanding of the entire chain of components.  Waltz receives support from Lieberson 
(1985). He argues that if empirical data are compiled at a lower level, they are totally 
irrelevant for drawing any conclusions about a problem at a higher level (Lieberson 
1985:114)
41
. It does not contribute anything to an explanation to construct small-scale models 
of real-size cases; one need to derive the essentials from multiple of cases (Waltz 
2010[1979]). Pure deduction alone, however, only describes what have already been 
presented (Ibid: 11). But combining induction with deduction would allow for the 
construction of general theories while staying true to the complexity of relations. This is 
                                                 
38 An ELF index based on the (1964): Atlas Narodov Mira (Atlas of the People of the World). Moscow: Glavnoe upravlenie geodezii i 
kartografii. 
39 The index was constructed by Taylor and Hudson (1972).  
40 In addition to construct theories, established theories can be tested case-specifically by measuring the cases‟ membership in different sets 
of conditions the emphasized in the given models. 
41 Recall the discussion from Chapter 2, concerning the misplaced level of analysis when applying ELF to capture group-level grievances 
22 
 
exactly what fs/QCA aims to do, so I argue that Waltz‟ demands to theory building are given 
a respectful treatment with fs/QCA. It is important to remember that causal complexity allows 
for even the most consistent condition to explain relatively small parts of the variation in an 
aggregation of an outcome. A condition thus might prove sufficient in producing war but 
could require a low-level analysis to be discovered. Exploring as many relations as possible 
could be more beneficial to the study of civil war than trying to locate one isolated coefficient 
with the isolated largest explanatory value, or, keep focusing on more creative ways to 
employ proxies.  
3.4 Research Design 
I will now give a presentation of the research design applied in this thesis. The design should 
account for the selection of cases, the strategy for the analysis and possible threats to validity. 
I rely on Ragin‟s introductions to the fs/QCA (Ragin 1987; 2000; 2008), and also derive 
useful directions from Caramani (2009) and Van der Maat (2011).   
 The units of observation are the Yugoslavian Federative units; Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia and Vojvodina. This small 
selection is justified by the expectation of this disaggregated, small-N approach to reveal 
important relations problematic for large-N studies to capture. I adopt a „Most Similar 
Systems‟-design for selection of cases as the units are expected to share a lot of attributes, but 
differ in producing the outcome. A fixed selection makes this study a quasi-experiment 
(Lieberson 1985:14; Mohr 1995:62f). Quasi-experiments face a threat to validity from 
selection bias. Mohr (1995) defines the threat from selection bias as the chance for initial 
differences between the groups affecting the outcome (Ibid: 77). Lieberson (1985) proposes 
that quasi-experiments require the researcher to make the irrelevant causal forces explicit to 
the reader (Ibid: 15). The solution in this study is to control for as many possible conditions as 
possible, and then reduce away trivial conditions. The operations of consistency and coverage 
would then exclude the threat to validity from both „irrelevant causal forces‟ and „the chance 
for initial differences to affect the outcome‟.      
 I start the analysis with a „within case‟-analysis; I conduct case-studies to construct the 
first table of raw data. The study is done by combining variables from large-N datasets with 
secondary literature on Yugoslavia. After the within-case analyses, I conduct the first cross-
case analysis. At this stage, I restrict the analysis to deal with dichotomous conditions; I 
measure whether they are present (1) or absent (0) in the observed units. To account for as 
many nuances as possible, I include several dichotomous variables that might be mutual 
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exclusive or together represent intervals of the same condition. This is how to test continuous 
variables in crisp-sets. The consistency and coverage operations are used to locate 
commonalities and contrasts among cases, thus revealing which relations deserve more focus 
in the next stage of the analysis. This approach combines two analytic strategies; i) an 
examination of cases sharing the outcome with an attempt to identify their shared causal 
conditions
42
, and ii) an examination of cases sharing a series of conditions and assess whether 
these cases share the same outcome, and if not, due to what conditions (Ragin 2008:18). Both 
strategies are employed because expressing the conditions leading to two mutually exclusive 
outcomes could give depth to the comparison and to a degree compensate for the small 
amount of cases producing „war‟.         
 It could be hypothetically possible to reduce the matrix already, but the truth table 
algorithm will contain amount of rows = 2
observed variable
 (Ragin 1987:87). At the crisp-set 
analysis, I am dealing with approximately 50 variables, which would provide 2
50 
rows of 
possible combinational outcomes. These are too many to make any logical assumption of the 
limited diversity (Ragin 1987; 2000; 2008). The fuzzy-set analysis is conducted on the 
conditions that survive the crisp-set analysis. This is done by combining conditions into 
causal combinations or by calibrating crisp conditions into fuzzy-sets. This allows us to 
reduce the amount of variables and thus achieve an approachable property space (Caramani 
2009:27). I simultaneously test for relations in the models of Collier and Hoeffler (2004), 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Hegre et al (2001). In addition to their initial measures, I 
translate their theoretical concepts into alternative measures more responsive to the 
disaggregated level. This way, I can recognize the quality of both theory and the applied 
measures.           
 After the sets are constructed, I decide on the cases‟ membership in each set. These 
decisions must be based on substantial empirical knowledge (Ragin 2000:150)
43
. Instead of 
being either a full member (1) or non member (0), the cases are now either “full nonmembers” 
(0) or has a degree of membership (M) (M>0.0).  Where the sets are derived from interval- 
and continuous variables, I use the Direct Method of Calibration to calibrate the fuzzy sets
44
. 
This method is based on log of the odds for full- and non membership (Ragin 2008:85-105)
45
. 
The method is beneficial when calibrating conditions such as „GNP/Capita46‟ into the fuzzy-
set „rich country‟: The only thing we must decide upon is where to put the thresholds for the 
                                                 
42 Similar to backward induction 
43 A reproduction of Ragin‟s (2000) classifications of degree of membership is available in Appendix 1. 
44 Degree of membership = exp (log odds)/[1+exp(log odds)], the method is from now referred to as “Direct log” 
45 Sheets for calibration using this method is available in Appendix 2 
46 GNP/Capita measures the product of each federative unit; while GDP is an aggregated domestic measure of Yugoslavia‟s product. 
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qualitative anchors; full- and full nonmembership, and the crossover point. When all cases are 
assigned to memberships in the fuzzy-sets, I construct a new truth table and employ truth 
table algorithm to reduce the solution to comprehensible expressions of the conditions leading 
to „war‟ and „~war‟. A comparison of the two contrasting expressions will compensate for the 
small amount of cases producing the outcome, and help widen the understanding of war as a 
function of the triangular relationship between ethnic grievances, secession and regime type. 
The conditions and the calibrations of the fuzzy-sets will receive proper attention in Chapter 
5, as the process is a central part of the actual analysis.  
3.5 Threats to Validity 
As was touched upon earlier, all quasi-experiments suffer from the threat to validity due to 
selection effects. What is an even more relevant threat to validity is limited diversity; the 
possible combinations of conditions left unobserved. This reduces our knowledge of the 
counterfactual – what would the outcome have been in these hypothetical cases? The larger 
the limited diversity, the larger is the proportion of unexplained combinations. To reduce the 
limited diversity, we can either increase cases or decrease variables. The former is difficult as 
the study has a fixed selection. The latter is partly the purpose of translating crisp-sets into 
fuzzy-sets. However, limited diversity must be expected to be the rule and not an exception in 
social sciences (Ragin 1987; 2000; 2008).       
 Lieberson (1985) points out four main threats to validity in non-experimental research 
designs: (1) the contamination problem; (2) the assumption of symmetrical causality; (3) the 
level of analysis
47
; and (4) the misuse of variance in deciding for variables and interpreting 
them (Lieberson 1985:49)
48
. Contamination occurs when the variables are imperfectly 
isolated from each other. In social science, we risk that the proximity of an independent 
variable affects the outcome, even if it is absent in the given case: “the sheer existence of X1 
in some setting may affect Y in situations where X1 is not even found” (Lieberson 1985:50). 
The study gets flawed if the effect of the independent variable is not confined to those cases 
where it is actually present (Ibid). In social science, it is impossible to isolate conditions from 
each other, so the risk of contamination might never be eliminated. However, when 
disaggregating conditions as much as possible, I don‟t necessarily exclude contamination but 
should be able to reduce its‟ threat to validity by locating it and make it explicit.   
 Ragin (2008) argues that while conventional statistical approaches suffers from the 
assumption of symmetrical causations, fs/QCA rather assumes asymmetry. When a researcher 
                                                 
47 Again, recall the discussion concerning the application of ELF in Chapter 2 
48 Recall the critique of Fearon and Laitin‟s (2003) operationalization of diversity-variables in Chapter 2 
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assumes symmetrical causation, he/she assumes that X‟s affect on Y is reversible, and that Y 
will be equally affected no matter in what direction we move X. “In examining the causal 
influence of X1 on Y, for example, one has also to consider whether shifts to a given value of 
X1 from either direction have the same consequences for Y” (Lieberson 1985:63). Also, 
irreversible effects occurs when X1‟s impact on Y remains even after X1 is reversed or 
removed (Ibid: 65f), and when a given causal sequence leads to a fundamental change in the 
dependent variable so that it will respond differently to other variables (Ibid: 74). I deal with a 
relatively large time aspect when I define the independent variables and would only assume 
several events made an irreversible effect on the outcome. By this, the irreversible effects are 
partly those I wish to locate and reversibility is not that crucial to my design. Having to 
reverse historical events in order to control for symmetric causation would only add to the list 
of hypothetical counterfactuals (Ibid: 82f).       
 The level of analysis can be crucial when translating relations and attributes from one 
level of analysis to another. For this study specifically, it would be critical if I translate the 
relations discovered at state level on to an international level
49
 (Lieberson 1985:107). The 
problem appears from both directions in this research design: 1) should the level of analysis 
be decreased to account for the different population clusters as the unit of analysis to secure 
internal validity? 2) Should the level of analysis be increased to account for more general, 
macro level mechanisms to secure the external validity? Eventually, it is an argument in favor 
of keep testing our results at different levels; we are not allowed to assume laws across levels, 
but could benefit from testing them across levels.       
 Finally, Lieberson warns about the misuse of variance, both when deciding for 
variables to study and when we interpret them. The concern is put to the pursuit of variables 
that vary the most properly, or variables that can account for the largest amount of variance in 
an outcome; this might lead researchers to study some problems while ignoring others 
(Lieberson 1985:91). Lieberson asks (p.92) “Is it reasonable, or even desirable, for a theory to 
account for the maximum possible level of variation in the dependent variable?” This is a key 
argument for applying set-relations theory and fs/QCA: Consistent relations might not 
constitute for a large share of the total variations of war onset. Still, they might account for 
sufficient conditions for war onset. The certain relations I explore in this analysis are not 
likely to vary in the same way through every case where the outcome is produced –perhaps 
not even in enough cases for the relation to echo in a significant correlation, thus leaving the 
                                                 
49 This is what Galtung (1967:45) would refer to as “the fallacy of the wrong level” (Galtung, Johan. 1967, Theory and Methods of Social 
Research. Oslo, Norway: Universitetsforlaget), cited in Lieberson (1985:107).  
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relation with poor explanatory power when measured in variance alone. It lies within fs/QCA 
to accept causal complexity. If we accept causal complexity it becomes less pressing to keep 
looking for the largest isolated coefficient.        
 The application of fs/QCA has been criticized for being deterministic. Caramani 
(2009) argues that fs/QCA should not be considered so, but rather as a deductive and logical 
method, drawing conclusions from lack of negative cases (Ibid: 87). If the purpose of the 
analysis is to explore causations rather than generalize from them, the deterministic attributes 
of fs/QCA might even be helpful in disaggregating approaches to subsets of a phenomena
50
 
(Ragin 2008: 58). Could it be argued that fs/QCA solves many of the problems with 
comparative strategies?  
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, I have introduced fs/QCA and the applied research design; which key terms I 
relate to in the analysis and which operations I will perform. I have pointed towards the 
benefits of applying the methods to certain aspects of conflict studies and how it can capture 
phenomena not easily proxied. In a discussion concerned with validity, I argue that fs/QCA 
can respond to many of the proposed threats in social research and quasi-experiments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 Casing: The analysis of combined conditions leading to a specific sample selection (Ragin 2000:58).   
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4.0 Data: Case-Studies of the Federative Units of Yugoslavia 
The first step of the analysis is to conduct thorough research on the conditions of interest 
within the units of analysis, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia, Slovenia and Vojvodina. Each condition is approached as to a question, for instance, 
“Croat majority” asks the question “Was there a Croat majority in the observed case?” The 
variable “Democracy” asks “Was the observed case a democracy before outbreak of war?” 
The purpose of the case-studies is to answer these questions with yes or no – in form of 
„present‟ or „absent‟. The data constitutes the truth table which will be essential in the further 
steps in the analysis. The entire truth table is available in Appendix 3.   
4.1 The Dependent Variable: War   
„War‟ is the dependent variable, or outcome, of the study. „War‟ refers here to “internal armed 
conflict” exceeding 1‟000 annual battle deaths51. The INTRASTATE dataset reports that 
conflict took place in Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although, the conflict 
that took place in Yugoslavia refer to conflicts in Slovenia and Croatia
52
. I stick to the 
COW
53
-threshold of 1‟000 battle deaths, and thus exclude the Slovenian conflict as it never 
exceeded 1‟000 battle deaths54 . Thus, „war‟ is present in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Sarkees 2000).     
4.2 Ethnic Composition 
Variables that deal with the ethnic composition in the federative units are constructed from 
Kalvyas and Sambanis (2005). They report on the ethnic composition in 1961, 1971, 1981 and 
1991. The variables are operationalized from the 1991-figures, as shown in Table 4.1. The 
data accounts for the conditions (a) „Serb majority‟, (b) „Croat majority‟, (c) „Bosniak 
majority‟, or (d) „other majority‟, for (e) „positive‟- or (f) „negative majority‟, and for (g) 
„significant Serb‟- or (h) „Croat minorities‟. This is to grasp the different possibilities for 
ethnic dominance, fear of ethnic dominance and polarization within each republic. It could 
also reflect the size of the excluded groups
55
. „Positive‟- and „negative majority‟ is meant to 
capture whether the largest ethnic group exceeds 50% of the population. In this way, I will 
capture ethnic dominance as it is defined by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), but additionally 
grasp cases where the majority group constitutes for less than 45% of the population. Every 
approach that can add to the richness and complexity of the ethnic composition is included. 
                                                 
51 The reason why it is not employed a disaggregated dependent variable, say, an „ethnic war‟, is that the small-N eliminates the need to 
disaggregate the dependent variable even further.   
52 As illustrated by “Terr” 
53 COW – the Correlates of War data project (Small and Singer 1982; Singer and Small 1994) 
54 Mønnesland (2006:405) reports 64, Ramet (1999:65) reports 54 
55 The threshold for significant minority follows the rhetoric of Fearon and Laitin (2003), with a floor on 5 % of the population. 
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„Ethnic pluralism‟, is added to guarantee that diversity is accounted for even in units lacking 
the specifications made in the former conditions. Diversity is present in all cases (Klemenĉiĉ 
and Žagar 2004:221). 
Table 4.1 Ethnic Composition in Yugoslavia, 1991, per federative unit 
 
I include a measure of ELF since so much research has employed the index to proxy 
grievances from the degree of diversity (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Easterly and Levine 1997; 
Fearon et al 2007; Fearon and Laitin 2003).
5657
. My scores differ from Fearon and Laitin 
(2003). This could be due to the data selection, level of analysis and time
58
. 
TABLE 4.2 ELF scores 
Unit ELF -1991 Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
 
1961 1971 1981 
Bosnia-Herz 70,3 69,7 (1992) 
 
70,7 66 72,1 
Croatia 36,6 33,4 (1992) 
 
31,5 34,8 40,4 
Kosovo 18 75,4 (1945-1990) 
 
49,6 42,8 34,8 
Macedonia 52 51 (1993) 
 
45,2 47,2 49,6 
Montenegro 58,1 75,4 (1945-1990) 
 
32,7 52,1 49,7 
Serbia 22,1 75,4 (1945-1990) 
 
14 18,7 24,9 
Slovenia 21,7 8,6 (1992) 
 
8,4 11,2 17,1 
Vojvodina 48,9 75,4 (1945-1990) 
 
59,6 59 60 
Yugoslavia' 78,8 75,4 (1945-1990) 
 
76,9 78,7 78,8 
Table 4.2 ELF scores 
 
                                                 
56 The ELF score is made from the Kalvyas and Sambanis data (2005), using following formula: ELF =  
           
      
57 In this measurement, all ethnic groups > 5 % and all “Yugoslavs” are combined with “other”, which is included in the measure if < 5%. 
58 Taylor and Hudson (1972) constructed the index from Department of Geodesy and Cartography in the State Geological Committees of the 
USSR (1964): Atlas Narodov Mira (Atlas of the People of the World). Moscow: Glavnoe upravlenie geodezii i kartografii. The index 
received an update in 1994.  
 Nationalities - fractions in percents        
 Serbs Muslims Croats Yugoslavs Montenegrins Albanians Slovenes Macedonians Other Total Condition 
Bosnia-Herz. 31,4 43,7 17,3 5,5 N/A N/A N/A 0,00 2,10 100,0 c,f,g,h 
Croatia 12,2 0,90 78,10 2,20 0,20 0,30 0,50 0,10 5,50 100,0 b,e,g 
Macedonia 2,20         21,00   64,60 12,20 100,0 d,e 
Montenegro 9,30 14,60   4,00 61,80 6,60     3,70 100,0 d,e,g 
Serbia Serbia "proper" 87,3     2,50         10,20 100,0 a,e 
Vojvodina 57,2 0,00 4,80 8,40 2,20 0,00 0,80   9,70 83,1 a,e 
Kosovo 10,0     0,20   90,00       100,2 d,e,f 
Slovenia 2,4 1,40 2,70 0,60 0,20 0,20 87,60 0,20 4,70 100, d,e 
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Figure 4.1 displays how Kosovo varies across polarization and fragmentation into minimal 
diversity. Montenegro increases towards polarization. The figure suggests that ethnic 
composition is a fluid condition. Table 4.2 and Figure 1 show how vulnerable the ELF index 
is from i) data selection, and ii) variation over time. It seems like ELF is a static measure for a 
dynamic condition. The ELF variable should be limited to measure the degree of diversity per 
se. With a threshold of ELF = 50
59
, the condition is present in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Macedonia and Montenegro.  
 
Figure 4.1 ELF based on Kalvyas and Sambanis (2005) 
„Multiple languages‟ is present in an observation where more than one language is spoken; all 
units employ multiple languages expect Bosnia-Herzegovina (Ellingsen 2000; Klos and 
McConnell 1974). „Majority Alternative Tongue‟ is present in observations where the 
majority speaks alternative languages to Serbo-Croatian, such as Slovenian or Albanian. The 
condition is present in Macedonia (Macedonian), Kosovo (Albanian) and Slovenia (Slovene). 
For details on the data collection and operationalization of these conditions, see Appendix 4
60
. 
Data on religious diversity is also derived from Ellingsen (2000), with supplements from 
Ramet (2006:289), Mønnesland (2006:395), and Kalvyas and Sambanis (2005)
61
. All units are 
                                                 
59
 Less fragmented societies are expected to be accounted for by variables concerning domination and general nuances in the ethnic 
composition. 
60To construct these variables, data are extracted from Ellingsen (2000)60 and supplemented by “Klos and McConnell (eds) (1974): Linguistic 
composition of the nations of the world: Europe and the U.S.S.R. Preview accessable at: 
http://books.google.no/books?id=sgxxLQ9JUZoC&pg=PA763&lpg=PA763&dq=Linguistic+composition+of+Yugoslavia&source=bl&ots
=Mji5bLhGA3&sig=kh1RDVmAbqbkSPxLXjul4J07c1w&hl=no&ei=86-ATYS4HsnLsgaV-
NzjBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=Linguistic%20composition%20of%20Yugosla
via&f=false , pages employed counts from p.761. 
61
 Again, the supplements must disaggregate „Yugoslavia‟ into Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Vojvodina. The supplementation is made 
by tracing the distribution of Albanians and Ethnic Muslims in each federative unit. 
49,6
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reported as having more than one major religion
62
, except Slovenia which is considered 
religiously homogenous. It is mostly reported a mix of Christians and Muslims throughout the 
federative units (Ellingsen 2000). For details on data collection and operationalization of this 
condition, see Appendix 5.         
 To account for the spread of the ethnic groups, the condition “large fraction outside 
republic” measures the size of the ethnic group living outside its own republic. The purpose is 
to measure which ethnic group were the most compact ones. The variable is constructed from 
Mønnesland (2006)
63
. Only in Slovenia and Macedonia is the variable absent, and Slovenes 
and Macedonians are thus the most “compact” nationalities. 
Table 4.3: Size of ethnic group outside republic (%) 
Slovenia – Slovenes 1,8* 
Croatia – Croats 18 
 Bosnia-Herzegovina – Muslims 17,4 
Montenegro – Montenegrins 34,2 
Macedonia – Macedonians 4,4* 
Serbia 
  "Proper" – Serbians 24,6 
  Vojvodina – Hungarians 9,7 
  Kosovo – Albanians 35,1 
Table 4.3 Size of ethnic group outside own republic 
 
4.3 Regime Type 
The significance of regime type has been emphasized in the theory. This condition separates 
between „democracy‟, „anocracy‟ and „autocracy‟ in order to grasp the three broadly defined 
regime types. The variables are constructed from the polityII-variable in Polity IV, with 
autocracy present at values -10 to -6, anocracy present at -5 to 5, and democracy is present at 
values 6-10 (Gurr, Jaggers and Moore 1989; Jaggers and Gurr 1995). Anocracies are expected 
to be most prone to conflict (Hegre et al 2001:40). Macedonia and Slovenia qualifies as 
democracies, while Croatia and the Yugoslavian units
64
 are anocracies
65
.  
 
 
                                                 
62 Not including diverse forms of Christianity 
63 As this study try to stay true to a 5% threshold for significant minorities, this principle is applied to this variable as well. Thus, a “large 
fraction” of own nationality outside republic requires at least 5% of the nationality. 
64 „Yugoslavia‟ accounts for Serbia , Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo, but unlike in the diversity-variables, it is not problematic that the 
status of the regime in all four units are reflect in one observation, as they had not disintegrated from each other and shared regime type. 
65 Bosnia-Herzegovina‟s status is disputed, and receives a 0 in all three variables. 
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Table 4.4 PolityII scores at 1991, from the PolityIV dataset 
Bosnia-Herzegovina N/A 
Croatia -3 
Macedonia 6 
Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo) -5 
Slovenia 10 
Table 4.4 PolityII scores at 1991, from the PolityIV dataset. 
Multiparty elections are accounted for to increase the understanding of the political conditions 
beyond the type of regime. All republics held multiparty elections in 1990 (Klemenĉiĉ and 
Žagar 2004:288ff; Mønnesland 2006:261; Ramet 2006:356-359). „Type of representation‟ is 
accounted for; Majority voting or Proportional representation. Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo and 
Croatia had majority voting (Mønnesland 2006). The results from the elections in Croatia and 
Serbia were political scenes totally dominated by nationalist parties (Mønnesland 2006:263; 
Ramet 1999:54). This reflects some of the political context in these regions. Macedonia had 
majority voting, and Slovenia and Montenegro had proportional elections (Cohen 
1995:150,158). Bosnia-Herzegovina receives absent in both, because the electoral system is 
somewhat disputed: Burg and Shoup (1999) reports it was a majority election on the district 
level (Ibid 49f), while Cohen (1995) claims it was a combination of the two kinds (Ibid 146).  
4.4 Secession  
„Secession‟ is theoretically very important and covers the units‟ policy towards the federation. 
Slovenia held a plebiscite on the issue 23th December, 1990, with a 90% in favor of declaring 
sovereignty. From then on, secession was official policy of Slovenia (Klemenĉiĉ and Žagar 
2004:291). Croatia followed almost instantly. Soon after, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia 
proclaimed independence as well (Ibid: 293)
6667
. By emphasizing the complexity of 
Yugoslavia‟s ethnic composition, it becomes mandatory to somehow treat the ethnic groups at 
a disaggregated level. „Internal secession‟ captures attitudes towards secession among non-
state actors, and thus their reaction to disintegration in 1991. Slavonian Serbs declared their 
intention to secede from Croatia and join Vojvodina. The Krajina Serbs declared their 
intention to seek annexation to Serbia (Ramet 1999:61). The Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
also started to demand autonomy (Klemenĉiĉ and Žagar 2004:292). Albanians in Kosovo 
wanted Kosovo to secede from Serbia (Burg and Shoup 1999:96).    
                                                 
66
 In spite of Macedonia previously voting against Slovenia and Croatia in the matter of the federation (Ramet 1992:285). 
67
 Montenegro, however, sided with Serbia in the attempt of keeping a strong federation intact (Ibid: 290). Also, the presidency of 
Montenegro had been couped and replaced with centralists loyal to Milosevic, as had the regimes in Kosovo and Vojvodina (Silber and Little 
1997:58-69) eliminating an official disintegration policy at those units‟ behalf. Although, some do report that Kosovo applied for recognition 
to the EC (Burg and Shoup 1999:96). Nevertheless, Serbia had withdrawn the autonomous privileges of the two provinces, and thus arguably 
also their policies 
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 „State interference‟ is meant to reflect interference in a unit from central government. 
This could mirror some of the relationship between central government and the peripheral 
units. By state interference, it is implied that central government trespassed republic- or 
provincial borders and autonomy, in order to interfere in what would usually be interpreted as 
internal affairs. Serbia “proper” would in this case be the centre, commanding the JNA from 
the federative capital Belgrade. The condition is present in Croatia, Kosovo, Slovenia and 
Vojvodina and thus absent in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia 
(Klemenĉiĉ and Žagar 2004; Mønnesland 2006; Ramet 3006; Silber and Little 1997). For a 
thorough narrative operationalization of this condition, see Appendix 6.  
4.5 Financing 
The following conditions are derived from the models of Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon 
and Laitin (2003) and Hegre et al (2001). First, Collier and Hoeffler‟s model is disaggregated 
into variables covering primary commodity exports, diaspora and hostile governments. 
 Collier and Hoeffler‟s (2004) main emphasis is on states‟ dependence on primary 
commodity exports. Second, they separate the exports of oil from non-oil, with a distinct and 
improving effect on the model; oil producing states are more prone to war than non-oil 
producers (Collier and Hoeffler 2004:580). To meet this distinction, I include a disaggregated 
proxy for the Primary Commodity Exports/GDP variable, and an oil variable. The threshold 
for presence of „exports dependent‟ is related to the peaking point of the effect located by 
Collier and Hoeffler. They find that the effect on civil war peaks at a 33% exports rate to GDP 
(Ibid)
68. Thus, for the condition to be present, the units‟ share of Primary Commodity Exports 
to GDP must be within the interval 30-35%. The variable is constructed from the federative 
units‟ exports-contributions, relative to their total contribution to Yugoslavian GDP. All 
relevant data and operationalizations are available in Appendix 7. When applying the 30-35% 
interval as cutting point between absent and present, the condition „Exports/GDP‟ is not 
present in any of the units. Hence, there is no reason to expect primary commodity 
exports/GDP to have neither reached nor surpassed 33%. Concerning oil, the industrial sector 
in Yugoslavia demanded a high generation of power, but Yugoslavia was simply not an oil-
producing country, thus, the condition is absent in all the units (Allcock 2000). I should also 
account for dependency on the agricultural sector
69
. The relative agricultural dependent units 
are Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Vojvodina The variable is constructed as follows: One 
                                                 
68 Observations with 33% oil- and primary commodity exports to GDP are expected to have a 22% higher chance of civil war than those with 
none. 
69 A small discussion of the agriculture is available in Appendix 8 
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unit‟s employment ratio is divided with each of the other units‟ employment rates 
(Mønnesland 2006). Where the „units‟ value ≤ 1.0‟ the observed unit is more dependent on 
agriculture than its dyadic partner. Where the „units‟ value ≥ 1.0‟ the observed unit is less 
dependent on agriculture than its dyadic partner. Next, I make a summary of each unit‟s ratio 
of more/less dependence on agricultural sector by dividing the amount of dyads where the 
unit is more dependent by the total amount of dyads where the unit appears. This gives a 0.0-
1.0 value. The cross-over point for the condition to be present is „units‟ value‟ ≥ 0.5. All 
details on operationalization are available in Appendix 9.     
 The matter of diaspora in the case of Yugoslavia is as tricky and complex as the ethnic 
composition and the distribution of nationalities throughout the republics. How should the 
variable be measured when analyzing at state-level? If a federative unit has a sufficient 
proportion of its‟ national group clustered within another unit, this is counted as „significant 
diaspora‟. By restricting the actors to the Yugoslavian units, I make sure that the diaspora 
accounted for is not a reflection of the conflict, but emigrated before the conflict. I wish to 
distinguish the diaspora variable from „large fraction outside republic‟ with increased 
demands for cohesion, thus the threshold is lifted from 5% to 10%. This, unfortunately, is just 
a proxy and must rely on a theoretical context: I expect it requires a larger proportion to 
influence policies than to be a part of the population per se. By these terms, Serbs are a 
relevant group in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Vojvodina and Kosovo. Bosnian Muslims are 
only a relevant group in Montenegro. Croats are relevant in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Montenegrins are too spread outside Montenegro‟s borders for sufficient cohesion and 
Albanians are a relevant minority in Macedonia. The condition „significant diaspora‟ is thus 
present for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia and Kosovo (Mønnesland 2006). For full 
details on operationalization of the diaspora, see Appendix 10.    
 I reoperationalize the „hostile government‟-variable70: Hostile governments are located 
by an analysis based on Ramet‟s (1992) account of Alliance Behavior among the Yugoslav 
Republics, 1961-90 (Ibid: 281-285). This data counts all sidings in federative disputes and 
gives an account of contradicting policies and reveals “opponents” among the units71. For 
further details on operationalization, see Appendix 10.   
 
                                                 
70 Collier and Hoeffler‟s (2004) original proxy for hostile government was whether or not the conflict took place under the cold war, and thus 
could be expected to be financed and supported as a part of the US-USSR struggle. They simply measure this by adding a pre-1989 
threshold. Obviously, this condition is absent in all units 
71 When analyzing, the data is narrowed down to 1980-90. 
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Case: 
Bosnia Croatia Kosovo Macedonia Montenegro Serbia Slovenia Vojvodina Hostility from/towards: 
Bosnia-Herz   0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Croatia 0   0 0 1 1 0 1 
Kosovo 0 0   0 0 1 0 0 
Macedonia 0 0 0   0 0 1 0 
Montenegro 0 1 0 0   0 1 1 
Serbia 1 1 1 0 0   1 0 
Slovenia 1 0 0 1 1 1   1 
Vojvodina 1 1 0 0 1 0 1   
Table 4.5 Hostile Governments 
 
4.6 State Capacity and Insurgency Conditions 
In Fearon and Laitin (2003), GDP/Capita is strongly significant. $1000 less in per capita 
income is associated with 41% greater annual odds of civil war onset. I choose to dichotomize 
GDP/Capita into intervals based on Fearon and Laitin‟s emphasis of different effects: A 
country in the 10
th
 percentile ($ 573) has an 18% chance of onset, compared to an 11% chance 
for countries at the median income ($ 1995) and a 1% chance for those in the 90
th
 percentile 
($ 9505) (Ibid:83). These percentiles are translated into thresholds for intervals; 1
st
 interval is 
≤ $ 573, 2nd interval is $ 573-$ 1995, and the 3rd interval is $ 1996 - $ 9505 (Ibid: 83). 
Parmelee (1992)
72
 gives a comparison of GNP/Capita
73
.  
Table 4.6: GNP per Capita, Republics and Provinces, 1987 
Slovenia  $                   5 127,00 
3rd interval 
Croatia $                   3 171,00 
Vojvodina $                   3 022,00 
Serbia Proper $                   2 304,00 
Montenegro $                   1 883,00 
2nd interval 
Bosnia – Hercegovina $                   1 759,00 
Macedonia $                   1 585,00 
Kosovo $                      743,00 
Yugoslavia  (average) $                   2 480,00 3rd interval 
(Parmelee 1992:324)  
Table 4.6 GNP/Capita, 1987 
                                                 
72 In Allcock, John (ed) 1992:324 
73 GNP is a disaggregation of GDP and measures the product of each federative unit. Fearon and Laitin‟s numbers account for 1985 $ US, 
while these numbers are from 1987. This could be problematic due to the large inflation in Yugoslavia in the 1980s. Unfortunately, these 
were all I could find at republic/provincial level.  
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Table 4.6 shows that none of the units are placed in the 1
st
 interval, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro are placed in the 2
nd
 interval, and Vojvodina, Croatia 
and Slovenia are placed in the 3
rd
 interval.       
 To Fearon and Laitin (2003) „mountainous terrain‟ makes it hard to mobilize 
infrastructure and for the state to reach the periphery, thus the condition favors insurgency 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003:85). Countries in the 90
th
 percentile
74
 have an estimated 13.2% 
chance of civil war. A similar country with no mountainous terrain (10
th
 percentile) has a 
6.5% risk (Ibid: 85). However, this is based on a relative figure measuring the share of the 
territory that is covered by mountains, but as their origin
75
 have 21 missing countries, these 
missing values are estimated by a calculation of the difference between the highest and the 
lowest point of elevation in each country (Ibid: 81, footnote 16)
76
. With a threshold at 50 this 
condition is only present in Bosnia-Herzegovina
77
.      
  Fearon and Laitin (2003) measure political instability by a change of 3 or more in any 
of the last three years on the Polity IV measure (Ibid: 81). For all the units this would imply a 
change of 3 in the case Yugoslavia, but this did not occur. Yugoslavia kept their value -5 from 
1981 until disintegration (Fearon and Laitin 2003). When considering events that occurred 
through the 1980s, and especially at the end of the 80s/beginning of the 90s, it feels wrong to 
claim that “political instability” was absent in Yugoslavia for the interval 1987-1990. When 
applying Fearon and Laitin‟s model, this data should be disaggregated into regional 
instability. There are numerous instances of instability not caught by the way it is proxied. 
Hence, the variable “political instability (regional)” qualifies to present in every unit. A 
narration of this operationalization is available in Appendix 11.    
   
4.7 Political Change 
To measure the units‟ membership in the model of Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch 
(2001), the study adds data for regime change and prior conflict
78
. Hegre et al (2001) define 
regime change to be “an alteration in an existing state greater than or equal to 2 in the 
democracy-autocracy index, or as the creation of a new state” (Ibid: 36). 6 years after a 
regime change, the effect on onset has decreased to 1.02 (Ibid: 38). Zero change from 1980 to 
1990 within the units disqualifies presence of “regime change” by Hegre et al‟s measure. 
                                                 
74 About half mountainous, or 50% share of mountains 
75 Gerard, A.J. for the DECRG project on civil was at the World Bank 
76 In their dataset, Slovenia, covered by approximately 70 % mountains, receives only a score of 9.4, while Bosnia receives a score of 60.5 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
77 Yugoslavia accounts for Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo. 
78 „Regime type‟ has already been accounted for. 
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However, it could be purposeful to capture this aspect by the regional instability-condition, 
elaborated on above (and in Appendix 11).       
 „Proximity to civil war‟ is measured by time in days since the last civil war ended; 
recent civil war increases risk of renewal, while there is only weak support for involvement in 
international wars to increase risk (Hegre et al 2001:41). INTRASTATE 3.0 reports no 
registered war before 1991 within Yugoslavia (Sarkees 2000). The Krajina Serb rebellion in 
the Knin rebellion, for instance, had no casualties, but is nevertheless accounted for in the 
regional instability-condition. It did ignite the war in Croatia, but this war “had begun without 
a shot being fired” (Silber and Little 1997:103). 
4.8 Summary 
In this chapter, I have presented data compiled from multiple case-studies and introduced the 
logic behind the operationalizations of the data into conditions. The data covers several 
conditions concerning ethnic composition, diversity, secession, and regime type, sources of 
finance, state capacity and political change. I have hoped to tackle the various theoretical 
aspects by accounting for as many conditions as possible, although I will be the first to 
acknowledge the amount of data and aspects left to be covered. Because of the amount of data 
and variables, I refer to Appendix 3 for the full truth table of conditions, and Appendix 4-11 
for more details on applied data and operationalization. In the next chapter I will apply this 
data to crisp- and fuzzy-sets analyses.  
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5.0 Cross-Case Analyses 
I now begin the process of reduction: At this state, the truth table consists of 50 variables, and 
although it is hypothetically possible to produce a solution from it, it would have no purpose. 
The complete truth table is available in Appendix 3. Since many of the conditions are subsets 
of one another, such as „Croat majority‟ and „Croat majority <50%‟, these are the first 
conditions to be reduced away. The next step is to conduct tests of consistency and coverage 
to locate commonalities and contrasts among the units of analysis.  
5.1 Crisp-Set Analysis 
Two cases produced the outcome „war‟; Bosnia and Croatia. This small N requires a 
consistency threshold of 100% (Ragin 2008:46). To control for trivial conditions, I apply a 
coverage threshold of 0.5 for conditions leading to „war‟. With this threshold, the condition 
must vary and thus be present in a maximum of 2 contradicting cases.  
Table 5.1 Conditions consistent in ’war’ 
Table 5.1 shows the conditions that remain after the first tests: 
„Serbian minority‟, „secession‟, „internal secession‟, „diaspora79‟, 
„~agricultural dependence‟ and „Serbian hostility‟. „Serb minority‟ 
together with „secession‟ and „internal secession‟ as necessary 
causes for „war‟ suggest that „war‟ is produced when Serbs react to 
Croatian and Bosnian secession from Serbia. This reaction could 
also explain why „internal secession‟ is necessary for „war‟. It is reasonable to assume that 
„diaspora‟ is a necessary support for war, and that hostility towards Serbia leads to war by 
causing secession. Concerning Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003) and 
Hegre et al (2001): None of the original components survived. The reason for this is mostly 
that the conditions do not vary across the cases, thus, the measures get too aggregated to 
survive across levels of analysis. Measures for prior conflict, regime change, exports and oil 
are absent when outcome is present, which contradicts their theoretical impact. „Political 
instability‟ and „Cold War‟ miss, but the alternatives I applied to measure the same theoretical 
propositions fits. Fearon and Laitin‟s original measure for political instability miss and is too 
trivial. The regional alternative is also too trivial. Diversity, measured by ELF, is dropped as 
well. Also, the alternatives for „hostile government‟ survive the test; presidential disputes with 
Serbia and Vojvodina are a consistent condition in the cases producing „war‟. The absence of 
                                                 
79 The reason why „Diaspora‟ survived both the consistency and the coverage thresholds, and „Large fraction of nationality outside republic‟ 
did not, is because the „Diaspora‟ condition put increased requirements of cohesion on the fractions. While in „Large frac…‟, there were no 
requirements for cohesion and the condition became trivial. 
War 
Serb minority 5%-49% 
Secession  
Internal Secession 
~Relative Agricultural Dependence 
Diaspora 
Hostile Government Serbia 
Hostile Government Vojvodina 
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agricultural dependence also survives. Could the absence of agricultural dependence be an 
indicator of necessary economical conditions for secession? To bring further depth to the 
other relations, I do a similar test for „~war‟ under the same criteria of 100% consistency. But 
since I now examine 6 out of 8 cases, the threshold for coverage is 6/7, or 0.85.
80
 Table 5.2 
shows the surviving conditions.   
Table 5.2 Conditions for ’~war’ 
When „~Croat minority‟ and „~Croat majority‟ both are consistent 
in „~war‟, this would imply that the absence of Croat populations 
in general is necessary for „~war‟. Recalling that Serb minorities 
are necessary for „war‟, this supports my theory concerning 
competing groups; Serbians and Croats struggled for the 
hegemony in Yugoslavia. Croats wanted more autonomy and parted from the federation.  The 
reason why Croatian absence would lead to absence of war would be because Croats both 
were disintegrationists as well as numerous and influential. The presence of Croats would 
thus lead to secession, a necessary condition for „war‟. Since „Serb minority‟ is also necessary 
for „war‟, the territories where both Croats and Serbs appear would experience war. This is 
according to my hypothesis concerning competing groups causing conflict. Notice that 
„largest ethnic group exceeding 50% of the population‟ is a necessary condition for „~war‟.  
This runs contrary to a common conception of ethnic dominance (Collier 2001; Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004). When an ethnic group constitutes a clear majority, this could bring stability to 
the region. Fearon and Laitin‟s terrain variable was not included in conditions for „war‟, but 
its‟ absence is necessary for „~war‟. This is an interesting aspect of the concept of 
counterinsurgencies; is the ability for rebels to hide less important than not having the ability 
to hide? „Multiple languages‟ is also consistently necessary for „~war‟. This could perhaps be 
caused by linguistic fragmentation decreasing Serbian or Croat claims for a given territory. 
This condition could add some depth to the understanding of ethnic and national identities. 
 To find out what separates the secessionists from each other, I do a similar test of 
commonalities but restrict N to the cases where „secession‟ is present. Now, I focus on 
conditions that are consistent and unique to the two causal combinations „secession AND war‟ 
and ‟secession AND ~war‟81. Thus, I put a coverage threshold at 1.0 in addition to the 
consistency threshold of 100%. I am able to keep „anocracy‟ and „democracy‟ as consistent 
                                                 
80
 Minimum coverage 6/8=0.75 and maximum 6/6=1.0, while in the first analysis, it was minimum 2/8=0.25 and maximum 2/2=1 
81 A table displaying this is available in Appendix 12 
~War 
 ~Croat minority 5%-49% 
~Bosniak majority 
~Croat majority 
Largest group > 50% 
Multiple languages 
~Mountainous terrain 
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conditions
82
. The analysis suggests that secession leads to war in cases where an ethnic 
minority supported by the centre is present, competing groups are present and democracy is 
absent. It is thus reasonable to argue that strong central supported minorities would lead to 
internal secession in absence of democracy. From the conditions leading to „war‟83, I have 
now some intricate relations to focus on. I add the analysis of secessionists to the first test. 
The following conditions pass the consistency- and the coverage test for „war‟ and „~war‟: 
Associated with ’War’ Associated with ’~War’ 
Serbian minority ~Croats 
Secession Largest ethnic group > 50%, non-Croat or non-Bosniak 
Internal Secession Multiple languages 
Diaspora ~Mountainous terrain 
~Agricultural dependence ~Secession 
Anocracy  ~Serbian minority 
Serbian hostility Democracy 
  ~Internal secession 
  ~Diaspora 
Table 5.3 Summary of conditions 
I do a thought experiment to see if conditions make logical sense negated. The negated 
conditions are all constituted by cases sharing the outcome (see Appendix 12). I add these 
conditions to the total list of consistent conditions.
84
 To get a notion of which conditions are 
necessary and which are sufficient, the conditions are tested by their frequency throughout all 
units
85
. The results are displayed in Table 5.4. The calculations are available in Appendix 13.  
Necessary causes for WAR (Value ≥ 0.25): Sufficient causes for WAR (Value < 0.25): 
Anocracy Croat majority 
Serbian hostility Bosniak majority 
Secession Negative majority 
Serbian minority Mountainous terrain 
Diaspora ~Multiple languages 
~Agricultural dependence   
Internal secession   
Croat settlements 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
82The missing values for Bosnia-Herzegovina is replaced by employing the principle of „Multiparty elections=1 AND ~Autocracy AND/OR 
~Democracy‟ = Anocracy. This would imply that democratic features are present, sufficiently to rule out autocracy, but not sufficiently 
present to qualify as democracy. 
83 , I reduce away Vojvodina hostility. Empirically there is no reason to believe that policies against Vojvodina would lead to war Also, 
Vojvodina policies would be advocated by Serbia, thus Vojvodina policies are subsets of Serbia‟s policies. 
84 Appendix 14 
85 Sufficient conditions are subsets of the outcome, thus have the value Xi ≤ Yi, while the necessary conditions are those conditions the 
outcome is a subset of, thus Xi ≥ Yi = necessary causes. 
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Necessary causes for ~WAR (Value ≥ 0.75): Sufficient causes for ~WAR (Value < 0.75) 
~Croat settlements ~Internal secession 
~Bosniak majority ~Serbian minority 
Positive majority ~Diaspora 
~Mountainous terrain ~Serbian hostility 
Multiple languages Agricultural dependence 
 
Democracy 
Table 5.4 Sufficient and Necessary conditions 
I wish to draw attention to some particular occurrences in Table 5.4. First of all „necessary for 
„war‟‟ is mirrored by „sufficient for „~war‟‟ and vice versa. We see that „anocracy‟, the two 
degrees of secession and the presence of Croats with Serbian settlements are necessary for 
„war‟. This supports Hypothesis 3, that war is produced when secession appears with 
competing groups and absence of democracy . Thus, it would be sufficient for a successor 
state to not have internal secession or to have democracy to produce „~war‟. Also, it is 
necessary for a state not to have Croat settlements or Bosniak majority to produce „~war‟ and 
the presence of these are sufficient for producing „war‟. Again, this suggests ethnic 
competition and polarization as these ethnic groups coexisted with Serbs settlements, and 
competed for influence in both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs 
never appear together within a democracy; this could be due to- or the cause of- the ethnic 
charged political spectrums. This tension comes in form of polarization in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and to the fear of dominance in Croatia. Both cases fail to mediate this tension 
with „democracy‟ and this limited diversity should be accounted for when concluding from 
the analysis. Interestingly, a large majority group is necessary for „~war‟ which is a direct 
opposite to the „dominance‟-proxy for grievance (Collier 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). 
Conditions that favor insurgency is supported as „mountainous terrain‟ is sufficient for „war‟ 
and its‟ absent is sufficient for „~war‟. 
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5.2 Fuzzy-Set Calibrations 
In this section, I reconstruct the conditions into fuzzy-sets. Then I present the logic behind 
these reconstructions and the classification of membership for each set. Some conditions will 
remain dichotomous, while others are calibrated either be a qualitative approach or by the 
Direct Log Method (Ragin 2008).  
Condition  Code What it measures Set degrees Method of calibration 
Croats Cr Croat settlements above 5% Crisp Qualitative 
Serbminority Ser Serbian minority Three-value Qualitative 
Cro.+bos.maj CrBo Croatian or Bosnian majority Crisp Qualitative 
Dominated Dom Largest ethnic group dominant in population Seven-value  Direct log 
Secession Sec Secession Crisp Qualitative 
Internal secesseion Isec Internal secession Crisp Qualitative 
Anocracy Ano deviation from PolityII scores 10 and -10 in Polity IV Five-value Qualitative 
Democracy Dem close to PolityII score 10 Five-value Qualitative 
Terrain T share of mountains Seven-value  Direct log 
Multiple languages Ml multiple languages spoken Three-value Qualitative 
Agriculture Agr rate of employment in agriculture Seven-value  Direct log  
Serbiahostile H Policy disputes with Serbia Seven-value  Qualitatively 
Diaspora D Largest cluster of diaspora Seven-value  Direct log 
Table 5.5 List of fuzzy-sets 
Croats, ('Cr'). Both a Croat minority and majority are necessary for „War‟. This set is a 
combination of the two conditions. This is a crisp set, with a threshold at 5 %. Serb minority, 
(„Ser‟), is a three-value set constructed qualitatively. Full membership (1): preferably above 
10 % of Serbs in the population. Ambiguity (0.5): When only a small minority exists (ca. 5%-
10%). Full nonmembership (0): Where the Serb settlements exceed 40% (not minority) or 
below 5% (too small). Croatian or Bosnian majority („CrBo‟) accounts for whether Croats or 
Bosniaks are the largest ethnic group in the unit. This is a crisp-set. Dominated, („Dom‟), 
accounts for the degree of domination by the largest ethnic group
86
. It is a seven-value set, 
constructed from the Kalvyas and Sambanis (2005) data, by the Direct Log Method with the 
anchors „Full membership (1): When an ethnic group constitutes for 95 % of the population‟. 
„Ambiguity (0.5): When the largest group constitutes for 50%‟ - this opens for polarization or 
high fragmentation, and „Full nonmembership (0): When the largest group constitutes for less 
than 40%‟. Terrain, („T‟), measures the logged relative distance between the highest and the 
lowest point in the unit, derived from Fearon and Laitin (2003). The values are translated 
directly into a seven-value set. Multiple languages, („Ml‟), is a three-level, qualitatively 
                                                 
86 Only in size, not in politics 
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constructed set. Full membership (1): 2 or more languages are employed by a substantial 
proportion of the population. (0.5): 1 major, other only spoken by small fractions. Full 
nonmembership (0): only 1 employed language. Secession, („Sec‟), accounts for whether or 
not the unit aimed for secession. Internal secession, („Isec‟), accounts for whether or not there 
were groups within the unit who claimed territorial secession. Diaspora, („D‟), is constructed 
by the direct log of the units‟ share of nationality outside own republic. These are calibrated 
into a seven-value set. Anocracy, („Ano‟), is constructed from the units‟ PolityII scores. It is 
qualitatively constructed into a five-level set by measuring the deviation from „0‟ (full 
anocracy), both above and below 0, and combining values into intervals. Full nonmembership 
(0): Values furthest from 0 [-10,-9 and 10,9]. Full membership (1): Within the interval [-
1,0,1]. Ambiguity (0.5): intervals surrounding [-5 and 5]
87
. Democracy, („Dem‟), is similar to 
„Anocracy‟, but does not include the entire PolityII scale. The lowest threshold for 
membership in this five-value set is a PolityII score of -5, any case equal or below is a full 
nonmember (0). The threshold for full membership (1) is a PolityII score of 8. Agricultural 
dependence, („Agr‟), measures membership in the proposal that the state is dependent on 
agriculture. This is a direct log of the units‟ employment rates in the agricultural sector. The 
set is constructed as a seven-value set. Full membership (1): 50 %, Full nonmembership (0): 5 
%. Serbian hostility, („H‟), is based on the measurement of relative hostile governments 
presented in Chapter 4. All units are measured upon Serbia‟s voting in the federative 
presidency; the amount of disputes the unit sided against Serbia is divided upon the total 
amounts both units appeared. This measure is calibrated into a seven-value set.  
 In addition, I test the consistency of conditions asserted with Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Hegre et al (2001). Most of these conditions remain 
crisp except „GDP/Capita‟ and „Exports/GDP‟. „GDP/Capita‟ is the seven-value set „rich 
country‟. It is calibrated by direct log88. „Exports/GDP‟ is reconstructed into „Exports‟. This is 
now a seven-value set, measuring the cases‟ membership in an exports-based economy. Full 
membership lies within the interval of 30-35% of exports to GDP, while full nonmembership 
lies within the 0-5% interval or above 60%
89
. Oil, regime change, regional and domestic 
instability, prior conflict and Cold War are measured as in the crisp sets. This produces the 
following truth table for analysis: 
                                                 
 
87
 Since Bosnia-Herzegovina is missing in Polity IV, it is given the same values as the rest of Yugoslavia: Serbia, Kosovo, Vojvodina and 
Montenegro. 
88 The thresholds are given by Fearon and Laitin (2003): For 1=full membership requires a GDP/Capita above the threshold for the 90th 
percentile ($9505), and 0=full nonmembership is awarded cases with a GDP/Capita below median ($5751). 
89 This is in order to fit with the expected curvilinear relationship between export dependence and risk of war. 
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  WAR Cr Ser Crbo Dom Sec Isec Ano Dem T Ml Agr H D 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1 1 1 1 0,33 1 1 0,5 0,25 1 0 0,17 0,5 0,5 
Croatia 1 1 1 1 0,67 1 1 0,75 0,25 0,17 0,5 0,17 1 0,67 
Kosovo 0 0 0,5 0 0,83 0 1 0,5 0,25 0,17 1 0,33 0,67 0,67 
Macedonia 0 0 0 0 0,67 1 0 0,25 0,75 0,17 1 0,33 0,5 0 
Montenegro 0 0 0,5 0 0,67 0 0 0,5 0,25 0,17 0,5 0,17 0,33 0 
Serbia 0 0 0 0 0,83 0 0 0,5 0,25 0,17 0,5 0,67 0 0,83 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0,83 1 0 0 1 0,17 0,5 0 1 0 
Vojvodina 0 0 0 0 0,5 0 0 0,5 0,25 0,17 1 0,17 0,5 0 
Table 5.6 Fuzzy-sets Truth Table 
 
5.3 Fuzzy-Set Analysis  
„Croats‟, „Serb minority‟, „Croatian or „Bosniak majority‟, „secession‟ and „internal secession‟ 
are consistently necessary for „war‟. „Croat population AND Serb minority AND Croat OR 
Bosniak majority‟ is thus a necessary combination for producing „war‟. For producing „~war‟, 
the necessary combination is „~Croat population AND ~Croat OR Bosniak majority‟ which 
add further support for the significance of Croats and the competition between Croats and 
Serb settlements. The truth table solution for the causal combination in Table 5.7 shows that 
the necessary causes for „war‟ are both consistent and has total coverage of the outcome. The 
conditions are thus combined into one combination of necessary causes.    
 Table 5.8 shows the truth table solutions for „war‟ and „~war‟. These are now my 
expressions for sufficient causes to war in Yugoslavia 1991-95. For a Yugoslavian state to 
produce war, it is sufficient to have a significant diaspora, to gain Serbian hostility, to not 
have an economy based on agriculture and to have an anocracy, as long as the necessary 
causes are present. For a state not to produce war, it is sufficient that the largest ethnic group 
exceeds 50% of the total population, the terrain is not harsh and the population is 
linguistically diverse and that the necessary causes for war are absent. 
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Analysis of necessary causes 
Outcome: WAR Outcome: ~WAR 
  Consistency Coverage   Consistency Coverage 
Cr  1.000 1.000 ~Cr 1.000 1.000 
Ser 1.000 0.666 ~Ser 0.833 1.000 
CrBo 1.000 1.000 ~CrBo 1.000 1.000 
~Dom 0.500 0.374 Dom 0.721 0.812 
Sec 1.000 0.500 ~Sec 0.667 1.000 
Isec 1.000 0.667 ~Isec 0.833 1.000 
Ano 0.625 0.357 ~Ano 0.624 0.833 
~Dem 0.750 0.315 Dem 0.458 0.846 
T 0.585 0.534 ~T 0.830 0.857 
~Ml 0.749 0.500 Ml 0.750 0.899 
~Agr 0.830 0.277 Agr 0.278 0.830 
H 0.750 0.333 ~H 0.500 0.667 
D 0.585 0.438 ~D 0.750 0.844 
Truth table analysis 
 
      Raw   Unique     
    Consistency coverage Coverage   
Cr*Ser*CrBo*Sec*Isec  1.000 1.000 1.000   
solution coverage:  1.000       
solution consistency:  1.000       
            
Table 5.7 Analysis of necessary causes and truth table analysis  
Table 5.8 Intermediate Truth Table Solutions 
                          
    --- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---                
    frequency cutoff: 1.000000        
    
    consistency cutoff: 1.000000     
raw unique 
 
    
    Outcome: WAR     
coverage coverage Consistency     
    diaspora*serbiahostile*~agriculture*~democracy*anocracy*necessary      0.585 0.585 1.000     
    solution coverage: 0.585005        
    
    solution consistency: 1.000000        
    
                          
  
 
**********************   
      
  
    --- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---                
    frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
      
    
    consistency cutoff: 1.000000  
   
raw unique     
    Outcome: ~WAR 
    
coverage coverage Consistency     
    dominated*~terrain*multiple languages*~necessary      
 
0.583 0.583 1.000     
    solution coverage: 0.583340  
      
    
    solution consistency: 1.000000  
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Now I wish draw attention to the two necessary conditions „secession‟ and „internal 
secession‟. How do we know if any of the sufficient causes are sources to secession and thus 
produce war through this causation? The necessary causes might be endogenous; one leading 
to another, thus both appears as necessary for the outcome. In statistics, this would be a 
problem of multicollinearity, but in fs/QCA, we can trace the causality to the subset-
relationship between the conditions. We know that both Slovenia and Macedonia seceded 
without war, and the crisp-set analysis supported the theory in its emphasis of regime type as 
a decisive factor for whether or not the secession comes with conflict or not. Together with 
the presence of democracy, what contrasted peaceful secession from conflicted secessions 
was the absence of Serb minority, internal secession and diaspora. This shows that absence of 
secession itself is sufficient for not producing war, but not necessary. It is possible to secede 
without war. As long as the ethnic context is not tense (as when Serbian minorities live under 
Croat or Bosniak majority) and democracy is present, war will not follow the secession.  
 
Figure 5.1 the observed causation linking war to regime type and ethnic grievances 
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 The validity of such a conclusion suffers from the limited diversity; I have no cases of 
observation where Serbs are minorities under Croats and Bosniaks in a democracy. However, 
these conditions could be made more general: Secession appearing together with competing 
ethnic groups and democracy. This was also the case in Macedonia, where the Albanian 
minority constituted for over 20%, which is a larger proportion than the Serb fraction in 
Croatia. Thus, Macedonia‟s peaceful secession can work as an example where democracy is 
present, ethnic polarization is present, secession is present but war is absent. This would 
support that democracy could be sufficient to discharge ethnic tensions. However, it could be 
questioned how comparable Serbs and Albanians are. Albanians in Macedonia were not used 
to domestic majority and central kinship in power as Serbs were.     
 I have argued earlier that internal secession is a response to state secession. If so, 
internal secession should be a subset of secession and the latter a necessary condition for the 
former. The test for necessary causes for „internal secession‟ for the secessionist states90 in 
Table 5.9 supports this; secession is consistently necessary for producing internal secession
91
. 
„Anocracy‟ is also consistently necessary for „internal secession‟, and the absence of anocracy 
is consistently necessary for producing „~internal secession‟.  
Analysis of Necessary Conditions 
Outcome: Internal Secession Outcome: ~Internal Secession 
  
  
N=4   
  
N=4 
Conditions tested: 
 
Consistency Conditions tested: 
 
Consistency 
Cr 
  
1.000 ~Cr 
  
1.000 
Ser 
  
1.000 ~Ser 
  
1.000 
CrBo 
  
1.000 ~CrBo 
  
1.000 
Sec 
  
1.000 ~Sec 
  
0.000 
Ano 
  
1.000 ~Ano 
  
1.000 
D     0.585 ~D     1.000 
Table 5.9 Analysis of necessary conditions for internal Secession 
Table 5.9 shows how all the necessary causes for „war‟ reappear as necessary causes for 
„internal secession‟, but when restricting the analysis to the secessionist states, „anocracy‟ also 
becomes consistently necessary for the outcome.  This suggests that when studying causes of 
war in Yugoslavia, much of the answer could lie within causes of secession. The different 
                                                 
90 Thus, the same analysis, with N=4. An additional change is that Regime type is made crisp; Democracy 1 or 0, Anocracy 1 or 0. This de-
fuzzying of the condition is in order to make a clear distinction between the two conditions.  
91 When the set is expanded to include all eight units, „Secession‟ is less consistently necessary for „Internal secession‟. The reason for this is 
Kosovo, where Albanians wanted to secede from Serbia. Kosovo never seceded from Serbia. Croat population is also absent in Kosovo; this 
could suggest that Croat population is necessary for either secession itself – or for the claim for secession to be of significant force. I.e., 
Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina would have a stronger supporter in Croatia then Kosovo-Albanians would have in Macedonia or Albania. 
Finally, the Kosovo-Albanian cry for secession was not even strong enough for secession to become state/provincial policy. Point being, 
there are circumstances where Kosovo is a dubious case when deciding the case‟s importance as „internal secession‟. When Kosovo is 
excluded in the N=4-analysis, secession becomes a necessary condition for internal secession. 
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analyses have supported my theoretical propositions; ethnic grievances, in relation with 
secession and regime type expose a society to the risk of war. The reappearance of Serb 
minorities and Croats and Bosniaks suggest that ethnic grievances are best captured as 
competing groups and possibly also excluded groups. Croats and Bosniaks are domestic 
minorities to Serbs, while Serbs are a regional minority in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Secession would arguably have triggered fear of future dominance within these regions, and 
this tension is not institutionally mediated because democracy is absent in both cases. Also, 
recall from the case-studies that ethnic nationalist parties dominated both Croatia and Serbia, 
and also the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina
92
. This reflects the ethnic tension the political 
context was charged with in these states. I turn back to the hypotheses to summarize the 
analysis.           
 Hypothesis 1: Competing ethnic groups are necessary for secession to produce the outcome 
‘war’:  I have shown how Serb minorities are present with Croat or Bosniak majority when 
„war‟ is produced. In terms of competing groups, I remark that Serbian minority with a 
Kosovo-Albanian majority did not produce war. This could have various reasons, but I 
suggest that much of the explanation is in Kosovo‟s relative strength to Serbia, and that the 
submissive role of the region failed to put any real threat to the claim. Kosovo was a poor 
region and their policies were to a large degree directed from Belgrade. The political 
relevance of Croats and Bosniaks thus exceeds the relevance of Kosovo-Albanians in their 
competition with Serbs.         
  Hypothesis 2: Democracy is consistent in producing ‘~war’: I have shown how 
democracy consistently produces „~war‟ even within secessionists. Unfortunately, no cases 
could prove the effect of democracy on competing groups‟ response to secession, because no 
cases where Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks operated together produced democracy. However, the 
case of Macedonia shows how a society with a large minority could secede with democracy 
and avoid war. Still, the Albanian minority of Macedonia was not disconnected from a 
majority like the Serbs were, so the validity of this comparison should not be taken for 
granted. The hypothesis is still supported as democracy is consistent in producing „war‟, and 
war is never present when democracy is present.
93
        
 Hypothesis 3: War is produced when secession appears with competing groups and absence 
of democracy: Both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina consistently fits this hypothesis. This 
could suggest that secession came unprepared on premature successor states. It could also 
                                                 
92 Klemenĉiĉ and Žagar (2004:312) 
93 An interesting follow up to this study would be the causes to revolt in Macedonia, 1999-2000. Could this be due to institutional 
breakdown?  
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suggest that the legitimacy of the claim for secession suffered from a premature institutional 
state of development. It suggests that democracy is necessary to discharge the tension and 
uncertainty triggering ethnic competition. Could war occur because parts of the population 
wish to remain at status quo as long as the successor is just as institutionally inconsistent as 
the predecessor?           
 Hypothesis 4: When democracy is present at secession, internal secession is absent: 
Macedonia and Slovenia shows how secession does not provoke internal secession when 
democracy is present. The compactness of these units‟ nationalities is another possible 
explanation. But even though Slovenia was rather homogenous, Macedonia had a large 
minority which could have grabbed the opportunity to claim internal secession. However, 
even if this aspect suffers from limited diversity, it adds even further support to the 
significance of the presence of competing groups; i.e. ethnic grievances – because its absence 
produce an absence of internal secession.       
 As I am able to keep these hypotheses, I have gained empirical support for my 
theoretical proposition concerning the triangular relation between ethnic grievances in form of 
competing groups and fear of future dominance, secession policies and anocracy as regime 
type, and this relation‟s effect on civil war. I argue, in contrary to Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
and Fearon and Laitin (2003), that ethnic grievances might lead to civil war and that this 
effect is best captured in relation with political circumstances rather than by the size of ethnic 
groups and degree of diversity. I find support in Cederman et al (2007; 2009; 2010) and the 
concepts of polarization (Ellingsen 2000; Reynal-Querol 2002). But as I previously have 
argued in favor of embracing causal complexity, there could be some explanatory power in 
the models of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) as well. Thus, I now 
turn to test these models‟ case-specific validity.    
5.4 Comparison of Models 
The models were fragmented into separate conditions in the crisp-set analysis. Diaspora, 
agricultural dependence, mountainous terrain and the alternative measure for hostile 
government were given attention in the analysis. The conditions related to primary 
commodity exports, the main component of Collier and Hoeffler (2004), were not applicable 
to the case of Yugoslavia. Especially the concern with oil; none of the federative units were 
oil producers. I suggested „agricultural dependence‟ as a measure for dependence on primary 
sector, and thus also a proxy for the state of economic development. The absence of this 
condition is what is related to war in this case. This could arguably be due to the effect of 
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economic development on secession. Perhaps agricultural dependent regions are less likely to 
secede due to the premature economic development? This would anyway contradict the 
direction of Collier and Hoeffler‟s (2004) theoretical proposition; that such dependence would 
increase risk of war. Serbian hostility was also included in the analysis, and the aspect fits the 
theoretical intention of Collier and Hoeffler (2004). A revisit to the data would also show how 
Serb rebels in both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina received support from Belgrade. The 
presence of diaspora was also part of the truth table solution (Table 5.8). Theoretically, this 
could be because a spread nationality could increase fear of ethnic „disconnection‟ at 
secession. It could be interesting to pursue the effect of ethnic discontinuity in secessionist 
conflicts.           
 The most important component in Fearon and Laitin (2003) is GDP/Capita as a proxy 
for state strength. This condition did not make an impact on this analysis. Low GDP/Capita 
was not consistent in producing war, and high GDP/Capita was not consistent in producing 
the absence of war. The secession of Slovenia and Croatia could suggest that a relatively high 
GNP/Capita could lead to secession, but this could again be contradicted by Vojvodina. High 
GNP/Capita was nevertheless not necessary for secession, as neither Bosnia-Herzegovina nor 
Macedonia were members of the condition
94
. The most prominent component of Fearon and 
Laitin‟s model (2003) in this study is mountainous terrain. Mountainous terrain is not 
necessary for war, but its absence is sufficient for not producing war. This is according to 
Fearon and Laitin‟s theory, but instead of its presence causing war, its absence is causing 
peace.            
 Concerning Hegre et al (2001), I have based a lot of my theoretical proposal and my 
focus in the analysis on their conception of regime types. However, when applying their 
measures for regime change and conflict directly in my analysis, the results suggest that the 
measures are too aggregated to be case-specifically applicable. This has not been given much 
emphasis in my analysis, because, following Lieberson‟s (1985) principles of level of 
analysis, these measures are made at an aggregated level and have no immediate purpose on 
country level. Why then is not Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
treated under the same circumstances? Because they point to specific conditions within cases 
prone to conflict, conditions we should be able to locate. I would argue that Hegre et al (2001) 
are more concerned with abstract developments on an aggregated level, and these principles 
and “laws” are not traceable to a disaggregated level in the same way as the components in 
Collier and Hoeffler‟s and Fearon and Laitin‟s models.       
                                                 
94 GNP/Capita measures the product of each federal unit, while GDP would measure the aggregated product of Yugoslavia 
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 Table 5.11 shows the consistency of the models when both the original measures and 
alternative measures are included in the solution. When trivial and contradicting conditions 
are reduced away, diaspora and Serbian hostility remains from Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
model. It is far from consistent. Mountainous terrain, absence of rich country and the 
alternative measure for instability constitute the solution for Fearon and Laitin‟s model. This 
solution has lower consistency score than Collier and Hoeffler‟s model. From Hegre et al 
(2001) remain regime types and regional instability. I suggest that neither of these models are 
directly applicable to the case of Yugoslavia; either because the theoretical aspects do not fit, 
or the level of analysis does not allow for translating the models‟ attributes to a country level. 
 Intermediate solution, outcome: WAR 
Assumptions: 
1) Collier and Hoeffler 2) Fearon and Laitin 3) Hegre. Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch 
Cold War (present) Terrain (present) Democracy (absent) 
oil (present) Domestic instability (present) Anocracy (present) 
Exports/GDP (present) Rich Country (absent) Conflict (present) 
diaspora (present) Regional Instability (present) Regional instability (present) 
Serbia Hostility (present) 
 
Regime change (present) 
Agriculturual dependence (present) 
  
 
Raw and Unique Coverage Consistency 
1)  Diaspora*Serbia Hostility 0.585005 0.635872 
2) Terrain*~Rich Country*Region 
instability 
0.585000 0.534247 
3) ~Democracy*Anocracy*Region 
instability 
0.625005 0.357141 
Table 5.11 Intermediate Solution, Collier & Hoeffler, Fearon & Laitin, Hegre et al 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, the proposed hypotheses from Chapter 2 have been tested with the method of 
fs/QCA. The crisps- and fuzzy-sets analyses derived data from the case-studies presented in 
Chapter 4. From a list of 50 variables, I produced a truth table solution for sufficient causes of 
war and found support for the claim that war can be seen as a function of competing groups, 
secession and anocracy. The analyses have arguably given empirical support to the proposed 
significance of ethnic grievances, secession policies and regime type in a triangular relation 
affecting the risk of civil war. By this, I would support the claim made by Cederman et al 
(2007; 2009; 2010) and by Horowitz (1985), among others, that ethnic grievances‟ impact on 
civil war is more likely to be related to the political context rather than the size of the ethnic 
groups or the degree of diversity.   
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6.0 Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have set out to capture a triangular relation consisting of ethnic grievances, 
secession policies and regime type, and explore how these factors interact in having an effect 
on civil war.  Ethnic grievances can determine civil war, and this condition is best captured in 
relation to regime type and secession – as these components interact with ethnic competition 
to produce fear of dominance. It would be a false move to try to implement this proposition 
onto any diverse society. My propositions should be restricted to states where an ethnic 
tension can be captured. I have argued that some societies are ethnically „charged‟ from fear 
of dominance or ethnic competition and that a factor like democracy might mediate this 
tension. If democracy is present, secession can be executed and do not need to be discouraged 
as advocated by others. Figure 6.1 attempts to combine the theoretical propositions of Figure 
2.1 with the observed causations in Figure 5.1. Different lines are indicators for observed 
causations, proposed interactions and unobserved causation – limited diversity. 
 
Figure 6.1 Ethnic grievances affecting civil war through the political context; Regime type and Secession policies 
I have discussed how earlier attempts to capture ethnic grievances have failed and based my 
objections to these attempts on a critique of methodological choices; how the measures are 
conducted, what they are aimed to measure and the theoretical context they are charged with. 
I argue that the validity of Collier and Hoeffler‟s (2004) and Fearon and Laitin‟s (2003) 
attempts to capture grievances suffer from both level-of-analysis problems and from their use 
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of overtly simplistic proxies, and thus support the proposition that hypotheses of grievance for 
a long time were never really tested properly, only proxied.     
 In Chapter 2 I introduced and discussed the theory; civil war literature, the concepts of 
ethnic grievances and fear of dominance in relation with regime type and secession and 
conflicts. In Chapter 3, I introduced the fs/QCA methods, reviewed earlier applications and 
argued in favor of applying the method on disaggregated studies of civil war. This could 
increase our level of understanding of certain kinds of wars. In Chapter 4, I presented the 
within case-studies which constitute the data for the further analysis. In Chapter 5, I 
conducted crisp- and fuzzy-sets analyses to produce truth table solutions to war and the 
absence of war, and explored causations of war, secession and internal secession by 
conducting tests of necessary conditions. Finally, I evaluated the models of Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Hegre et al (2001) and found that most of their 
measures are too aggregated to be applied in specific cases, and although alternative measures 
provided support to some of the theoretical claims, the key components of their models 
received little support both substantially and theoretically.   
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Appendix 1 
 
Classifications of memberships applied in the analysis, Table 6.1 in Ragin 2000:156 
Crisp Set (1) Three-Value Fuzzy Set (2) Five-value Fuzzy Set (3) Seven-value Fuzzy Set (4) 
1= fully in 1=fully in 1=fully in 1=fully in 
  
0.75=more in than out 0.83=mostly but not fully in 
   
0.67=more or less in 
 
0.5=not fully out or in 0.5=crossover: neither in nor out 0.5=crossover: neither in nor out 
   
0.33=more or less out 
  
0.25=more out than in 0.17=mostly but not fully out 
0=fully out 0=fully out 0=fully out 0=fully out 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Verbal label 
Degree of 
membership 
Associated odds 
Log odds of full 
membership 
Full membership 0.993 148,41 5,0 
Threshold of full membership 0.953 20,09 3,0 
Mostly in 0.881 7,39 2,0 
More in than out 0.622 1,65 0,5 
Crossover point 0.5 1,00 0,0 
More out than in 0.378 0,61 -0,5 
Mostly out 0.119 0,14 -2,0 
Threshold of full nonmembership 0.047 0,05 -3,0 
Full nonmembership 0.007 0,01 -5,0 
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Appendix 3 
 
  Case 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Variables 
Bosnia-
Herz 
Croatia Kosovo Macedonia 
Monten
egro 
Serbia Slovenia Vojvodina 
War 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
         
Serb minority 5%-49% 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Croat minority 5%-49% 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bosniak majority 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bosniak majority <50% 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Serbian majority 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Serb majority <50% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Croat majority 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Croat majority <50% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Largest ethnic group > 50% 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Largest ethnic group <50% 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ethnic pluralism 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ELF > 50 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Multiple languages 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Alternative tounge 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Multireligious 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Large fraction of nationality outside 
republic 
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Democracy 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Anocracy 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Autocracy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Multiparty elections 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Majoritarian representation 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
Proportional representation 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
State interference (<1991) 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Secessionist (from federation) 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Secessionist (internal) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Exports/GDP above 30% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Relative Agricultural Dependence 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 
Oil producer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Significant Diaspora 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
COLD WAR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hostile Government B-H - 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Hostile Government Cro 0 - 0 0 1 1 0 1 
Hostile Government Kos 0 0 - 0 0 1 0 0 
Hostile Government Mac 0 0 0 - 0 0 1 0 
Hostile Government Mon 0 1 0 0 - 0 1 1 
61 
 
Hostile Government Ser 1 1 1 0 0 - 1 0 
Hostile Government Slo 1 0 0 1 1 1 - 1 
Hostile Government Voj 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 - 
GDP/Capita 1st interval 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GDP/Capita 2nd interval 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
GDP/Capita 3rd Interval 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Mountainous terrain 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Political instability (domestic) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Political instability (regional)  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Regime change (1980-1990) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Conflict before 1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Regime pre breakup: Democracy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Regime pre breakup: Anocracy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Regime pre breakup: Autocracy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Appendix 4 
Reynal-Querol (2002) measures polarization of linguistic and religious groups. This diversity 
should be captured. Ellingsen (2000) and Klos and McConnell (1974) are employed to specify 
the conditions within the aggregated “Yugoslavia”; which in Ellingsen‟s dataset would 
account for Serbia, Montenegro, as well as Kosovo and Vojvodina. The supplementation is 
done by exploring these four units‟ application of Albanian, Hungarian95 and Slovene. 
Ellingsen (2000) reports that „Yugoslavia‟, alongside Macedonia, Croatia96 and Slovenia are 
multi-linguistic, while Bosnia-Herzegovina is not. Serbo-Croatian was the alternative 
language in Slovenia, whilst the largest alternative language in „Yugoslavia‟ and Macedonia, 
was Albanian. Klos and McConnell (1974) add that for Kosovo, the majority tongue was 
Albanian, while the largest minority was Serbo-Croat, reflected in the ethnic composition 
(Kalvyas and Sambanis 2005; Klos and McConnell 1974). In Vojvodina, Serbian was the 
official language, but there were relatively large factions speaking Hungarian and other 
languages (Klos and McConnell 1974). In Serbia “proper”, there were smaller factions of 
Albanian- and Slovene speakers. In Montenegro, a vast majority spoke Serbo-Croat, about 
81.4%, while about 5.5% spoke Albanian (Klos and McConnell 1974:782;766). I interpret 
these data as sufficient for counting Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and 
                                                 
95
 In Vojvodina, the application of Hungarian is added to reflect the ethnic composition given by Kalvyas and Sambanis (2005). 
 
96
 The dataset has some problems with the largest minority in Croatia, while some sources report “Albanian”; I choose to interpret this as a 
temporal mistake, based on data from pre-disintegration. However, the Slovenian speaking faction in Croatia is sufficient to account Croatia 
as multi-linguistic (Klos and McConnell (1974). However, note that this deviates from Kalvyas and Sambanis‟ (2005) accountant of ethnic 
Slovenians in Croatia, separating linguistics from conventional ethnicity.   
62 
 
Slovenia as multi-linguistic, while the condition is absent in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
  
Appendix 5      
In Montenegro, Albanians constituted 1.9 % and Muslims 3.9% - qualifying Montenegro as a 
multi-religious society as estimated Muslims exceed 5% of the population (Mønnesland 
2006). In 1981, Ramet (2006) reports that Ethnic Muslims constituted for 78‟080 of a total 
population of 585‟000. In Serbia “proper”, Albanians constituted for 3.5% and Muslims for 
7.6% (Mønnesland 2006). In 1981, Muslims constituted 151‟674 of 5‟679‟000 (Ramet 2006). 
In Kosovo, Albanians were in majority with 74% according to Mønnesland, and 90% 
according to Kalvyas and Sambanis. In addition, Mønnesland reports 2.9% Muslims. Ramet 
reports 58‟562 Ethnic Muslims in Kosovo in 1981, of a total 1‟595‟000. In Vojvodina, 
however, Mønnesland reports only 0.2% Muslims and 0.1% Albanians. These numbers match 
with those of Kalvyas and Sambanis (2005). Ramet reports 4‟930 Muslims of a total 
population of 2‟029‟000 in Vojvodina in 1981. Thus, Vojvodina, alongside Slovenia does not 
qualify as a multi-religious society 
Appendix 6 
By December 1971, a Croat nationalist movement had gained force and momentum with 
demands of increased Croat autonomy charged with certain anti-serbism. To settle the 
disputes, police and military forces entered Zagreb December 2
nd
 (Mønnesland 2006:226). 
This is often referred to as “the Croatian spring” (Ramet 2006:91). In 1990, the Krajina-Serb 
rebellion in Kninska Krajina forced Croat authorities to intervene. This was met by 
interference from JNA, arguably on behalf of the Serb rebellion (Silber and Little 1997:92-
104). This rebellion was followed by a similar Serbian movement in Slavonia, in Croatia – 
also met by JNA interference (Klemenĉiĉ and Žagar 2004:303ff).     
 For Kosovo, Tito‟s death led to a demand for republican status from a Kosovo 
Albanian nationalist movement which accumulated in 1981. Government reacted sharply, and 
deployed 30‟000 troops. Reportedly, there were nine casualties (Mønnesland 2006:239). In 
1988, Kosovo saw large demonstrations and counter-demonstrations. Belgrade sought to end 
strikes by force (Silber and Little 1997:62-69). Political leaders were arrested and 
demonstrations put down. The national assembly was besieged by tanks and forced to accept 
changes in the constitution removing Kosovo autonomy (Mønnesland 2006:247). 
 Vojvodina saw turbulence in the same period as Kosovo. The political leaders pleaded 
Belgrade to aid to end the turmoil known as “The Yoghurt Revolution”. Milosevic demanded 
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the regime‟s resignation in return and made them accept the reformed constitution and thus 
managed to crumble Vojvodina‟s autonomy and increase Serbian field of power (Silber and 
Little 1997:58ff). Montenegro also saw large demonstrations and attempts at coups through 
1988-89, arguably directed and backed by Belgrade – with the ultimate result of Serbia 
securing Montenegrin support in the federative presidency. Still, direct interference by JNA 
and central government is not reported (Silber and Little 1997:61).   
 During the “Slovene spring” in 1988, JNA interfered in the Slovene political scene, 
taking over the investigation of Slovene nationalists and arresting opponents at own will. This 
violation of republic autonomy, arguably qualifies to state interference (Silber and Little 
1997:48-57). There are no specific reports of state interference in Macedonia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  
Appendix 7 
The Primary Commodity Exports-thesis is disaggregated in three components; exports/GDP, 
oil and agricultural dependence. Since it is complicated to find data covering the units‟ 
national exports ratio, an estimate of the units‟ contribution to Exports/GDP have to do. This 
will be unproblematic if all the ratio‟s are below the threshold interval, because the „Primary 
Commodity Exports‟ is a subset of „Total Exports‟, thus „Primary Commodity Exports‟ must 
be ≤ „Total Exports‟. The major problem in this case is to measure GDP, commodity exports 
and production at a national level (GNP). Even Collier and Hoeffler had problems with the 
GDP sample in the case of Yugoslavia (Collier and Hoeffler 2004:567). The variable is thus 
operationalized as “Exports/GDP”, and estimated from data presented by Mønnesland 
(2006:396) and data extracted from Teodora.com and CIA Factbook
97
. The variable is 
constructed from the federative units‟ exports-contributions, relative to their total contribution 
to Yugoslavian GDP. All relevant data is presented in the tables. 
 
GNP Exports 
Yugoslavia* $129,5 billion $13,1 billion 
*1989 
 
  
Source: Theodora.com; CIA Factbook   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
97 http://www.theodora.com/wfb1990/yugoslavia/yugoslavia_economy.html, Accessed 03.15.11. 
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% of Yugoslavia's * 
  Exports GDP 
Slovenia 30,2 16,5 
Croatia 20,4 25 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 14,4 12,9 
Montenegro 1,6 2 
Macedonia 4 5,8 
Serbia "proper" 20,7 25,6 
Vojvodina 8,3 10,3 
Kosovo 1,2 2,1 
*1990. Source: Mønnesland 2006:396  
 
 
Estimated ratios 
  
Exports/GDP  
Slovenia 
18,52 % 
Croatia 
8,25 % 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
11,29 % 
Montenegro 
8,09 % 
Macedonia 
6,98 % 
Serbia "proper" 
8,18 % 
Vojvodina 
8,15 % 
Kosovo 
5,78 % 
 
When applying the 30-35% interval as cutting point between absent and present, the variable 
“exports/GDP” is not present in any of the units. Hence, there is no reason to expect primary 
commodity exports/GDP to have neither reached nor surpassed 33%. 
Appendix 8 
The economic factors are important in the Yugoslav case, regardless of Collier and Hoeffler‟s 
(or Fearon and Laitin‟s) findings. The economic development might have been crucial in the 
definition of the ethno politics – as pointed by John Allcock:   
“The steady republicanisation of the economy, however, meant that the commitment of 
liberals to widening the scope of market forces came to be given a nationalist 
expression, and the case for accelerated economic modernization came to be 
represented (…) as a matter of the adverse effects of the power of “Belgrade”, 
working together with the “backward South” (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, 
Montenegro), upon the economic development of the “advanced” North (Croatia and 
Slovenia). Economic modernization thereby came to be linked generally to the forces 
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of nationalism which the Tito regime had worked so hard since 1945 to defeat” 
(Allcock 2000:90).         
Generally, Yugoslavia had by 1971 seen an overall fall in the population engaged in 
agriculture, a fall in the rural population and an increase in the urban population (Allcock 
2000:89). During the forging of the regime, and when the units‟ were under previous empires, 
the export-based economy was crafted around primary products. What separated the units‟ 
form of production was the form of the agricultural products, not the dependence on the 
agricultural sector. Later, the regime turned away from agricultural exports and towards 
heavy industry (Allcock 2000:101). 
Appendix 9 
Of several reasons the Yugoslavian economy might very well have been dependent on 
primary commodities even though it was not evident through exports rates. Thus, the study 
should also account for domestic dependency on the agricultural sector. The table shows 
employment in agriculture. 
 
Employed  in agriculture, % 
  
Slovenia 9,4 
Croatia 15,2 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 17,3 
Montenegro 13,5 
Macedonia 21,7 
Serbia "proper" 27,6 
Vojvodina 19,9 
Kosovo 24,6 
 
Source: Mønnesland 2006:396 
 
From these data, one could construct measures of relative agricultural dependence based on 
pairwise analyses. By this approach the most dependent unit in a pair should be the most 
prone to war.  The next table shows the pairwise relationships among the states. The variables 
are constructed as follows: One unit‟s employment ratio is divided with each of the other 
units‟ employment rates. Where „units‟ value‟ ≥ 1.0, the observed unit is MORE dependent on 
agriculture than its partner. Where „units‟ value‟ ≤1.0, the observed unit is LESS dependent 
on agriculture than its partner. 
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 Measure of relative agricultural dependence  
  
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
Croatia Kosovo Macedonia Montenegro 
Serbia 
"proper 
Slovenia 
Vojvodin
a 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
  
1,13815
8 
0,70325
2 
0,79723502
3 
1,28148148
1 
0,626811594 
1,84042
6 
0,8693467 
Croatia 0,878612717   
0,61788
6 
0,70046082
9 
1,12592592
6 
0,550724638 
1,61702
1 
0,7638191 
Kosovo 1,421965318 
1,61842
1 
  
1,13364055
3 
1,82222222
2 
0,891304348 
2,61702
1 
1,2361809 
Macedonia 1,25433526 
1,42763
2 
0,88211
4 
  
1,60740740
7 
0,786231884 
2,30851
1 
1,0904523 
Montenegro 0,780346821 
0,88815
8 
0,54878 
0,62211981
6 
  0,489130435 1,43617 0,678392 
Serbia "proper" 1,595375723 
1,81578
9 
1,12195
1 
1,27188940
1 
2,04444444
4 
  2,93617 1,3869347 
Slovenia 0,543352601 
0,61842
1 
0,38211
4 
0,43317972
4 
0,69629629
6 
0,34057971   0,4723618 
Vojvodina 1,150289017 
1,30921
1 
0,80894
3 
0,91705069
1 
1,47407407
4 
0,721014493 
2,11702
1 
  
Source: Mønnesland 2006:396  
  
 
 
More dependent on agriculture than 
(MDEPONAG) 
Cases - units of observation 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
Croatia 
Koso
vo 
Macedo
nia 
Monteneg
ro 
Serbia 
"proper" 
Sloveni
a 
Vojvodi
na 
MDEPONAG Bosnia-Herz. - 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 
MDEPONAG Croatia 1 - 1 1 0 1 0 1 
MDEPONAG Kosovo 0 0 - 0 0 1 0 0 
MDEPONAG Macedonia 0 0 1 - 0 1 0 0 
MDEPONAG Montenegro 1 1 1 1 - 1 0 1 
MDEPONAG Serbia "proper" 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 
MDEPONAG Slovenia 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 
MDEPONAG Vojvodina 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 - 
(Souce: Mønnesland 2006:396)                 
 
Next, there is made a basic summary of each unit‟s ratio of more/less dependence on 
agricultural sector, by dividing the amount of pairs where the unit is more dependent by the 
total amount of pairs where the unit appears. This gives a 0-1 figure. To be more “in than out” 
in relative dependence, the unit needs a value ≥ 0.5. The relative agricultural dependent units 
are thus Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Vojvodina.  
  Cases - units of observation 
Relative agricultural dependence* 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
Croati
a 
Kosov
o 
Macedon
ia 
Montene
gro 
Serbia 
"proper" 
Slove
nia 
Vojvodi
na 
Relative agricultural dependence   0,428571429 
0,2857
14 
0,8571
43 
0,714285
714 
0,142857
143 
1 0 
0,57142
86 
Relative agricultural dependence >0,5 = 
Present (1) 
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 
 *(presense/absense of MDEPONAGi) 
(Souce: Mønnesland 2006:396)                
 
67 
 
Appendix 10 
The matter of diaspora in the case of Yugoslavia is as tricky and complex as the ethnic 
composition and the distribution of nationalities throughout the republics. How should the 
variable be measured when analyzing at state-level? It becomes problematic when translating 
continuous variables into dichotomous variables; where to put the threshold for membership? 
What is a significant diaspora?         
 This study chose to relate “diaspora” and “hostile government” to two levels of 
external support; non-state actors and state actors within Yugoslavia. Meaning, if a federative 
unit has a sufficient proportion of its‟ national group living in another unit, this is counted as 
“significant diaspora”. If one unit continuously sides against another unit, this counts as 
hostility. By restricting the actors to the Yugoslavian units, we make sure that the diaspora 
accounted for is not a reflection of the conflict, but emigrated before the conflict. Also, by 
keeping hostile governments within Yugoslavian units, it is more approachable to operate on 
the basis of the units‟ policies.         
 To stay true to what have been defined as the threshold for a significant proportion of 
population, it could be argued that the “diaspora”-variable is present if a unit has more than 
5% of its nationality within the other units. But we wish to distinguish the diaspora variable 
from the “compact nationality” variable, thus the threshold is lifted from 5% to 10%.  
% of nationality in other units 
  
Bosnia-Herzegovina 17,4 * 
Croatia 18 * 
Macedonia 4,4   
Montenegro 34,2 * 
Kosovo 35,1 * 
Serbia 24,6 * 
Slovenia 1,8   
Vojvodina 9,7   
(Mønnesland 2006:396). *Above 10%=Present 
 ETHNIC DIVERSITY, revisited 
Nationalities - fractions in percents 
 
Serbs Muslims Croats Montenegrins Albanians Slovenes Macedonians 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 31,40 43,70 17,30 
   
0,00 
Croatia 12,20 0,90 78,10 0,20 0,30 0,50 0,10 
Macedonia 2,20 
   
21,00   64,60 
Montenegro 9,30 14,60 
 
61,80 6,60     
Serbia "proper" 87,30 
    
    
Vojvodina 57,20 0,00 4,80 2,20 0,00 0,80   
Kosovo 10,00 
   
90,00     
Slovenia 2,40 1,40 2,70 0,20 0,20 87,60 0,20 
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Theoretically, those units with present diaspora will be the most prone to enter conflict. 
Serbia, with submissive units Kosovo and Montenegro, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, all 
participated in conflict, one way or the other. The four ethnicities/units that surpassed the 
threshold at 10 % living abroad was Bosnians (Muslims), Croats, Montenegrins, Kosovo 
Albanians and Serbs.          
 If we are to keep the threshold at 10% of a population, in order to meet the expected 
requirements of cohesion and influence, Serbs are a relevant group in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Vojvodina and Kosovo. Bosnian Muslims are only a relevant group in Montenegro. 
Croats are relevant in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Montenegrins are too spread outside 
Montenegro‟s borders for sufficient cohesion (theoretically off course) and Albanians are a 
relevant minority in Macedonia. From this two-step analysis, it is hereby argued that the 
variable “Significant Diaspora” should be present in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia and 
Kosovo, to account for the spread of their “home nationality”.      
 Hostile governments are located by a pairwise analysis. The variable is based on 
Ramet‟s (1992) account of Alliance Behavior among the Yugoslav Republics, 1961-90 (Ibid 
281-285). This data counts all sidings in federative disputes and gives an account of 
contradicting policies and reveals “opponents” among the units. When analyzing, the data is 
narrowed down to 1980-90. The data accounts for alliance behavior in 11 disputes in that 
period. It is operationalized as follows: if Serbia sides against Slovenia, these units are 
“hostile” in that dispute. The frequency of opposing couples is then measured against the total 
amount where the units both appear in a pair. Maximum possible is 11 pairs, as there are 11 
disputes. Example; Slovenia‟s relative hostility towards Montenegro is measured by how 
many times they side against each other in the disputes they both appear in. This gives a 0-1 
ratio for all couples. The value ≥ 0.6 qualifies for “hostile governmenti”.   
 
Sided against each other Bosnia  Croatia Kosovo Macedonia Montenegro Serbia Slovenia Vojvodina Total  
Bosnia-Herzegovina   4 2 3 2 5 5 4 8 
Croatia 4   1 2 7 9 1 3 10 
Kosovo 2 1   0 2 4 2 2 5 
Macedonia 3 2 0   2 3 4 2 6 
Montenegro 2 7 2 2   3 8 4 9 
Serbia 5 9 4 3 3   9 1 10 
Slovenia 5 1 2 4 8 9   3 11 
Vojvodina 4 3 2 2 4 1 3   5 
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Total appearances together Bosnia Croatia Kosovo Macedonia Montenegro Serbia Slovenia Vojvodina Total  
Bosnia-Herzegovina   8 5 6 8 8 8 5 8 
Croatia 8   5 5 9 9 10 5 10 
Kosovo 5 5   4 5 5 5 5 5 
Macedonia 6 5 4   6 6 6 4 6 
Montenegro 8 9 5 6   9 9 5 9 
Serbia 8 9 5 6 9   10 4 10 
Slovenia 8 10 5 6 9 10   5 11 
Vojvodina 5 5 5 4 5 4 5   5 
 
Opposing-ratio Bosnia  Croatia Kosovo Macedonia Montenegro Serbia 
Sloveni
a 
Vojvodina 
Bosnia-Herzegovina   0,5 0,4 0,5 0,25 0,625 0,625 0,8 
Croatia 0,5   0,2 0,4 0,777777778 1 0,1 0,6 
Kosovo 0,4 0,2   0 0,4 0,8 0,4 0,4 
Macedonia 0,5 0,4 0   0,333333333 0,5 
0,66666
7 
0,5 
Montenegro 0,25 0,777778 0,4 0,333333333   
0,3333
33 
0,88888
9 
0,8 
Serbia 0,625 1 0,8 0,5 0,333333333   0,9 0,25 
Slovenia 0,625 0,1 0,4 0,666666667 0,888888889 0,9   0,6 
Vojvodina 0,8 0,6 0,4 0,5 0,8 0,25 0,6   
 
With the threshold at ≥0.6 to qualify as present, the following truth table indicates which 
states receive “present” at what “hostile couple”: 
 
Bosnia Croatia Kosovo Macedonia Montenegro Serbia Slovenia Vojvodina 
Hostile Government Bosnia-Herz   0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Hostile Government Croatia 0   0 0 1 1 0 1 
Hostile Government Kosovo 0 0   0 0 1 0 0 
Hostile Government Macedonia 0 0 0   0 0 1 0 
Hostile Government Montenegro 0 1 0 0   0 1 1 
Hostile Government Serbia 1 1 1 0 0   1 0 
Hostile Government Slovenia 1 0 0 1 1 1   1 
Hostile Government Vojvodina 1 1 0 0 1 0 1   
Also, it is interesting to see that those couples with highest frequency reveal a polarization 
between Croatia and Slovenia on one side, against Serbia and Montenegro on the other. The 
most allied couples are Croatia and Slovenia, and Serbia and Vojvodina. 
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Appendix 11 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) refers to political instability as minor changes in regime, but not 
necessarily sufficient for actual regime changes. This is supposed to mirror events that have 
lead to a disorganized and weak centre. If events took place that destabilized the regions, this 
could qualify as political instability at a disaggregated level, even though it did not provoke a 
sufficient change in the federative center‟s regime value as given by the Polity IV measure. 
Kosovo and Vojvodina definitely saw a change of political conditions when Serbia 
unconstitutionally withdrew their autonomy. As in these two, Montenegro saw large 
demonstrations and attempts at coup d‟état in the republic presidency, the second attempt 
even succeeded (Silber and Little 1997:58-69). In Croatia, there were rebellions in 
Knin/Krajina, with a capital-backed claim for autonomy for the region, and secessionist 
attempts in Slavonia (Ramet 1999:61). All units introduced multiparty elections in 1990 and 
the League of Communists lost hegemony in most republics (Klemenĉiĉ and Žagar 
2004:288ff; Mønnesland 2006:261; Ramet 2006:356-359). 
Appendix 12 
 
Variables WAR ~WAR 
Secession 1 1 
   
Serb minority 5%-49% 1 0 
Democracy 0 1 
Anocracy 1 0 
Secessionist (internal) 1 0 
Diaspora and Large fractions of nationality outside republic 1 0 
’War’ and ’~War’ in ’Secession’ 
Negated conditions for ~War →War Negated conditions for War → ~War 
Croats (2/2 cases) ~Serbian minority (4/6 cases) 
~Positive Ethnic Majority, non-Croat, non-Bosniak (2/2 cases)  ~Secession (4/6 cases) 
~Multiple languages (1/2 cases) ~Internal secession (5/6 cases) 
Mountainous terrain (1/2 cases) Agricultural Dependence (4/6 cases) 
  ~ Diaspora (4/6 cases) 
  ~Serbian hostility (3/5 cases) 
Negated conditions 
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Appendix 13 
 
 
Cases Value 
WAR 2/8 0,25 
Secession 4/8 0,50 
Internal secession 3/8 0,38 
Serbian minority 4/8 0,50 
Croats (Croat minority OR majority) 2/8 0,25 
Diaspora (Sig.Diaspora AND Large fraction outside republic) 4/8 0,50 
Serbian hostility 5/7* 0,71 
~Agricultural dependence 4/8 0,50 
Croat majority 1/8 0,13 
Bosniak majority 1/8 0,13 
Negative majority 1/8 0,13 
Anocracy 6/8 0,75 
Mountainuos terrain 1/8 0,13 
~Multiple languages 1/8 0,13 
*Serbian hostility is not measured for Serbia, thus only in seven cases 
  Cases Value 
~WAR 6/8 0,75 
~Internal secession 5/8 0,63 
~Serbian minority 4/8 0,50 
~Croats (Croat minority OR majority 6/8 0,75 
~Dispora 4/8 0,50 
~Serbian hostility 3/7* 0,43 
Agricultural dependence 4/8 0,50 
~Croat majority 7/8 0,88 
~Bosniak majority 7/8 0,88 
Positive majority 7/8 0,88 
Democracy 2/8 0,25 
~Mountainuos terrain 7/8 0,88 
Multiple languages 6/8 0,75 
*Serbian hostility is not measured for Serbia, thus only in seven cases 
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Appendix 14 
 
Conditions accociated with War Conditions accociated with ~War 
Secession, state AND internal ~Iinternal secession 
Serbian minority ~Serbian minority 
Croats ~Croats 
Diaspora ~Diaspora 
Serbian Hostility ~Serbian Hostility 
~Agricultural dependence Agricultural dependence 
 Croat/Bosniak, OR negative majority Non-Croat/Bosniak, AND positive majority 
Anocracy Democracy 
Mountainous terrain ~Mountainous terrain 
~Multiple languages Multiple languages 
 
